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 In roughly 590 BCE, a “league of neighbors” developed in central Greece.  The 
Amphictyony at Pylae joined together with Delphi to create the Delphic Amphictyonic 
League.  The league gained political prowess throughout Greece through its protection of 
the sacred space of Delphi.  Meanwhile in Macedonia, Macedonian kings sought Greek 
identity with the implementation of Greek culture in the Macedonian court.  When the 
Thebans took Philip II of Macedon hostage as a teenager, they trained him in the central 
Greek military, political, and cultural tactics.  This upbringing resulted in Philip’s 
understanding of the importance of the Delphic Amphictyony to not only the central 
Greeks, but to the Greeks as a whole.  Philip used the Third Sacred War, fought at 



































"...ἐνὸς δὲ ἀνδρὸς εὖ φπρονήσαντος ἃπαντες ἂν ἀπολαύσειαν οἱ βουλόμενοι κοινωνεῖν τῆς 
ἐκείνου διανοίας." - Ἰσοκράτης  
“… on the other hand, if a single man were to come up with a clever thought, all mankind 
who wished would benefit from that man’s brilliance.” — Isocrates, Panegyricus  
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 Standing just a short distance from the final resting place of Philip II of Macedon, 
it is no wonder these tombs stayed hidden for millennia in Vergina, Greece.  While 
outside the tombs, a slow incline acts as an undetectable burial mound.  The modern and 
small entrance belies the invaluable riches found in her belly.  Archaeologists did not lay 
eyes on the mausoleum dedicated to the father of Alexander the Great until 1977 
supposed to be in tomb II, but found inside impeccable frescos and mosaics, glorious 
monuments, and the Macedonian sunburst inlaid on golden boxes.  The majesty of the 
cultural and literal treasure found inside mesmerizes any visitor to the site.  The man 
interred there had united the Greek states and then faded to the background of historical 
memory.  Thus, the burial mound serves as an allegory for the life of Philip II of 
Macedon. 
 Macedonia sits at the top of the Greek peninsula, the land entrance into the 
peninsula and shield from non-Greeks.  The crosshairs of trade intersect there, since the 
east to west trade route across the Mediterranean runs through Macedonia, as does the 
north and south trade route which links Greece to the greater Mediterranean by land.
1
  
N.G.L. Hammond begins his anthology of the History of Macedonia with the sentence, 
                                                          
1
 Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière Hammond, A History of Macedonia, vol. I Historical 
Geography and Prehistory (Oxford: 1972), 3. 
2 
 
“Our first need is to define Macedonia not as a political area but a geographical entity.”2  
Geographically Macedonia consistently held two important rivers within her boundaries 
— boundaries which constricted and swelled regularly — the Haliacmon and the Vardar.  
Each provided Macedonia with fertile plains and marshes essential to agriculture and 
timber, as well as access to the Aegean through the Thermaic Gulf.
3
   
The geographical space of Macedonia has one unique characteristic that separates 
her from the rest of Greece; her climate is continental rather than Mediterranean.  This 
climate automatically connects Macedonia spatially with the north, or continent, rather 
than with the south.  In the late fourth century BCE, Macedonia had a tendency to look 
north, for political, diplomatic, and military support, rather than to the south.  “Thessaly,” 
Hammond observes, “rather than Southern Macedonia is the transitional zone between 
the Continent and the peninsula.”4  In addition to climate similarities, the continent shares 
with Macedonia a rich abundance of natural resources, bringing immense wealth to the 
regions.  Macedonia is filled with gold, silver, copper, iron ore, and lead, all minerals 
found in Thrace as well.  The natural resources and wealth of Macedonia made it 
essential to the prosperity of the rest of Greece, making just the space alone Greek in 
order for the Greeks to survive.  Those things that should link Macedonia with the north 
make her indispensable to the Greeks, who could not afford to lose her to the continent.   
The legitimate spatial divides between Greece and Macedonia led to a conflict in 
Macedonian identity.  Scholars have spent the past century arguing the cultural 
                                                          
2
 Hammond, HM vol. I, 6-7. 
3
 Hammond, HM vol. I, 4.   
4
 Hammond, HM vol. I, 5. 
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similarities of the Macedonians and their Greek city-state neighbors.
5
  Debate has raged 
about the participation of Macedonians in Greek cultural festivals, particularly the 
Olympic and Pythian Games, and whether such participation constituted Macedonia as a 
Greek State.  Few scholars, however, have built an argument hinged on the Greek 
political identity of the Macedonians, particularly as a result of the Third Sacred War.  
Prior to the Third Sacred War, however, the erratic “activation” of Greek identity 
complicates the matter of Greek-ness for the Macedonians.
6
  Macedonians call on their 
Greek heritage in certain instances, and not in others.  That “activation” causes a reaction 
in the Greek world.  The Third Sacred War acts as a resolution of Macedonian Greek 
identity for the Macedonians, as well as for the regions of central Greece.   
Four Sacred Wars took place in Greece, all of which centered on the governance 
and administration of the sacred site of Delphi.  Delphi — as a Panhellenic site located 
within the central Greek state of Phocis — had a nearly unavoidable spatial dilemma.  
Since all Greek states felt she belonged to them, the Greeks sought to wrestle Delphi 
from the grasp of Phocis, a struggle which lasted two and a half centuries.  Like 
Macedonia, the perception, reaction to, and identity of Delphi differed in the eyes of each 
Greek state.  All Greeks tried to act piously towards the site — all save for maybe Phocis 
— as a home to the god Apollo.  As a place dedicated to the god, Greeks saw it as 
                                                          
5
 N.G.L. Hammond, Guy T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. II 550-336 B.C. 
(Oxford: 1979), 100; Eugene Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus (Princeton: 1990), 80; 
Ernst Badian, “Greeks and Macedonians,” Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and 
Early Hellenistic Times, vol. 10 (1982), 35; W. Lindsay Adams, “Sport and Ethnicity in 
Ancient Macedonia,” Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and 
Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza (2008), 58. 
6
 An explanation of identity in terms of “activation” comes from Èric Rebillard.  Èric 
Rebillard, Christians and Their Many Identities in Late Antiquity: North Africa, 200-450 
CE (London: 2012), 4. 
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customarily autonomous, and therefore any governance or administration that acted on 
behalf of the site or Pythian Apollo had to make systematic decisions in an elevated 
manner in regards to the site, with no state or political motives in mind, only those 
centered on the interests of the god.  The best way to do this, however, varied from state 
to state.  Therefore a league — the Amphictyony or Amphictyonic League — was 
created in which states could vote on behalf of the sacred space of Delphi.  This would 
determine the actions Delphi should take in matters of interstate politics and military 
intervention, leading to states taking military action on behalf of the god.  Those 
militaries, then, ultimately saw themselves as divinely instated, a status each Greek state 
clamored to attain.  By the end of the Third Sacred War, the last military force and state 
to attain that status was Macedonia.   
Macedonian involvement in the Third Sacred War, however, did not come from 
an inherent interest from either Macedonia or their king, Philip II.  Rather, Philip tried to 
appease two Greek states with whom he had diplomatic relationships, in order that one 
(Thessaly) end a debilitating civil war, and that the other (Thebes) not suffer a loss in a 
larger war with the Spartans, Phocians, and Athenians.  Both Thessaly and Thebes had 
protected Macedonia in the past, and it was Macedonia’s turn to aid their central Greek 
allies.  The Macedonians — while acting as the avengers of the god — did not have an 
ultimate goal in the south in mind.  Having been thrown into the Third Sacred War, they 
did not seek hegemonic power in Greece, but were granted it at the conclusion of the war, 
at which point Philip found himself the leader of the Amphictyonic League and hegemon 
of Greece, a title he accepted, but never sought — a title for which the Athenians vilified 
him, and destroyed his reputation.  The Athenians had never wished to recover 
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diplomatic relations with Philip after Amphipolis, and struggled to convince the whole of 
Greece of his tyrannical tendencies.  They named him the “barbarian conqueror,” the 
essence of which historical memory has never erased from Philip’s character.  But the 










 Herodotus and Pindar offer the earliest and most basic meaning of ἀμφικτίονες 
(amphictyons) as “they that dwell around.”1  Later the Greek word Ἀμφικτύονες 
(Amphictyonic League) came to describe several multiregional religious organizations 
which appeared in Greece during the Archaic Period.
2
  Only two lasted until the Classical 
Period, those centered on Delos and Delphi.
3
  Each was set at a major sanctuary.  Since 
the Amphictyonies were tied directly to these Panhellenic sanctuaries, the preservation of 
them at such sites indicates they shared a Panhellenic political, as well as religious, 
purpose.
4
  This chapter investigates the role of the Delphic Amphictyonic League — 
referred to as simply the Amphictyony hereafter — as the embodiment of Panhellenic 
politics, certainly among central Greek states, but also extending to Athens and Sparta,
                                                          
1
 Hdt. 8.104, Pind. P. 4.66, 10.8; Henry Liddell and Robert Scott, s.v. “aμφικτύονες,” 
Greek-English Lexicon, vol. I (Oxford: 1889), 92. 
2
 Liddell, Scott, “Ἀμφικτύονες,” 92. 
3
 Michael Scott, Delphi: A History of the Center of the Ancient World (Princeton: 2014), 
77. 
4
 Scott claims that the importance of the Amphictyony predates the importance and 
precedence of the sacred site.  That is not to say the sanctuary itself did not exist before 
the Amphictyony, but that the Amphictyony and site grew at a similar rate to reach a 
prestige that helped both last into the Classical Period. Scott, Delphi, 77.    
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 and in later chapters, finally to Macedonia.   
The Amphictyony met twice a year, once at Delphi and once at Pylae — known 
later as Thermopylae.
5
  Each of the states within the Amphictyony sent two 
representatives, called hieromnemones and pylagoras, to the councils at Delphi and 
Pylae.
6
  These two groups of delegates, which made up a body of the council, were 
known together as the Amphictyons.
7
  When the council met these representatives made 
court decisions, dispersing judgments, punishments, and rewards on any individual Greek 
or Greek city-state deemed fit for the action.  According to the oath taken by all 
Amphictyons, each polis included in the Amphictyony was obligated to “make war and 
destroy” any polis that violated agreements made among those belonging to the 
Amphictyony, and the Amphictyons were charged with calling for such action.
8
  The 
agreements banned the limiting or cutting off of a water supply or the razing of a member 
polis.
9
   
Those states — or in some cases tribal cantons — which belonged to the 
Amphictyony originated with those associated with the Amphictyony before Delphi, the 
association during the time of Pylae.  Aetolian tribes made up the bulk of the organization 
at that point.
10
  Victor Ehrenberg states that the Amphictyony at Pylae must therefore 
have existed before the polis, but this claim is not substantiated by other modern scholars, 
                                                          
5
 Basil Petrakos, Delphi (Athens: 1971), 4; William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and 
Roman Geography (London: 1854). 
6
 Petrakos, 4; Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, “Administration of Justice in the 
Delphic Amphictyony,” Classical Philology, vol. 38 (1943), 1. 
7
 Bonner, Smith, 1 
8
 Aeschin. 2.115. 
9
 Aeschin. 2.115; Bonner, Smith, 1; Ryder, T.T.B., Koine Eirene: General Peace and 
Local Independence in Ancient Greece (Oxford: 1965), 4. 
10





  Twelve states belonged to the Amphictyony and each had two 
votes. Ehrenberg believes that the two votes were awarded after Athens and Sparta made 
their way onto the Amphictyony, but, again, does not have substantial evidence.
12
   
The Amphictyony was divided into two parts: those tribes north of Thermopylae, 
and those south of Thermopylae.  The Thessalians, with their two votes, dictated the 
voting practices of the tribes north of Thermopylae.  The Delphic site itself granted states 
the right to consult the oracle in a particular order, and the relationship each state had 
with Delphi determined the order they consulted.  Anyone belonging to the Amphictyony 
had the chance to consult the oracle before nonmembers of the Amphictyony could.
13
  
This tradition of consultation automatically incentivized Greek states to join the 
Amphictyony, giving the League Panhellenic status.  
The French school of thought has dominated the Delphic narrative in the 
twentieth century due to the French excavation of Delphi.
14
  French archaeologists 
entered Delphi in 1892 to uncover the sacred site, and worked there for nearly a half 
century.
15
  More particularly, twentieth-century French scholars have argued the 
Amphictyony was, in fact, not only Panhellenic, but a “prototype European Union.”  The 
latter part of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century offer a different and 
more complex view of the Amphictyony, specifically among French scholars, but also 
                                                          
11
 Ehrenberg, Victor, The Greek State (New York, NY: 1960), 109. 
12
 Ehrenberg, 111. 
13
 Scott, 15. 
14
 Scott, 267-74. 
15





  These scholars insist that the Amphictyony was not Panhellenic, but 
instead a “multiregional … old-fashioned, and yet supple institution that lacked 
permanence and continuity and drifted in and out of usefulness and power as and when it 
suited the needs of various of its members.”17  Even N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, 
in their complex and detailed account, A History of Macedonia volume II, label the 
Amphictyony an “Old Boys’ Club.”18   
The main argument against the institution fitting nicely into the category of 
Panhellenism comes from a lack of source material explaining the happenings of the 
Amphictyony during the fifth century, particularly from Herodotus.
19
  Simon 
Hornblower, however, disagrees and adamantly argues against this claim by using 
Plutarch, who states that the Spartans wished to control votes completely in 478.
20
  He 
even derides the previous scholars who argue against Plutarch’s dates by saying, “[s]ome 
moderns disbelieve this, fancying in their modest way they know more about Delphi than 
                                                          
16
 Scott, 78, note 326. C. Tenekides, “L’Amphictyonie de Delphes et la Ligue de 
Corinthe, dans leurs affinités avec la Société des Nations,” Revue Générale de 
l’Académie de droit international public (1931), 5-20; G. Daux, Amphictyony: An 
International Organisation in Antiquity, Sather Lectures, Berkley (1957); G. Daux, 
“Remarques sur la composition du conseil Amphictionique,” BCH, vol. 81 (1957), 95-
120; M. Sordi, “La foundation du college des naopes et le renouveau politique de 
l’Amphictionie au IVe siècle,” BCH, vol. 81 (1957), 38-75; C. Tenekides, 
“L’Amphictyonie delphique. Légende et réalité,” Annuaire de l’Association des auditeurs 
et des anciens auditeurs de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, vol. 90, no. 2 
(1958), 145-155; P. Amandry, “L’Amphictionie delphique,” in Zepos, J., ed. Symposium 
L’idée delphique en l’Europe (Athens: 1979), 123-136. 
17
 Scott, 78.   
18
 Hammond, Griffith, HM vol. II, 452. 
19
 Scott, 78, 326.  However, Plutarch writes his De Herodoti Malignitate to show 
precisely the bias Herodotus has against the central Greeks and central Greek politics, 
insisting that Herodotus does not show an accurate depiction of these types of matters.   
20
Plut. Them. 20; Simon Hornblower, “Did the Delphic Amphiktyony Play a Political 
Role in the Classical Period?,” Greek and Roman Networks in the Mediterranean (New 
York: 2009), 49-51.   
10 
 
did Plutarch, a Delphic expert.”21  So then, since the fifth century did show a deliberate 
interest in the Amphictyony, by Sparta nonetheless, the argument against a consistent use 
of the Amphictyony showing it as non-Panhellenic cannot remain valid.
22
   
Samuel Perlman offers a different perspective on the Panhellenism of the 
Amphictyony in his article “Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism.”  He observes the 
Panhellenism of the Delphic Oracle and the Pythian Games at Delphi, but struggles with 
labeling any political entity Panhellenic, since the Greeks were not unified politically 
until Philip II’s hegemony.23  He believes that “the ideology of Panhellenism is seen as 
an expression of the ambition to destroy the narrow framework of the Greek polis.”24  
This claim is interesting and insightful, but leaves no room for the existence of political 
unity between all Greeks, and relies on culture and language as elements that joined all 
Greeks together.  This position is arguable, but only if the definition of Panhellenism 
indicates that all Greek states came to political unity as equals.  If any state comes to a 
diplomatic or political organization, such as the Amphictyony, with greater political 
influence over the other states there, in Perlman’s argument, then that state practices 
imperial power over the weaker states, and Panhellenism cannot stand in the midst of 
                                                          
21
 Hornblower, 50. 
22
 Hornblower continues on with this point as the latest in a series of scholarly exchanges 
between himself and the modern French scholar F. Lefèvre about the use and importance 
of the Amphictyony in the fifth century.  Lefèvre agrees with Hornblower that the 
Amphictyony was in use, but disagrees in that he believes it was not important. 
Hornblower explains that Lefèvre says the Amphictyony during the fifth century was 
“not an instrument of power, but only of prestige.” Hornblower takes issue with the word 
‘only,’ implying that prestige is power. Hornblower, 50; F. Lefèvre, CID IV: Documents 
Amphictioniques (Paris:2002). 
23
 Samuel Perlman, “Panhellenism, the Polis and Imperialism,” Historia: Zeitschrift für 
Alte Geschichte, vol. 25 no. 1 (1976), 3-4. 
24






However, political disparity exists between any two states, no matter their 
political similarities.  In that case, political Panhellenism could never have existed in 
Ancient Greece, which is what Perlman essentially argues, and imperialism in Ancient 
Greece disguised itself as political Panhellenism.  This claim leaves no intermediary 
space for Panhellenic politics between complete autonomy and imperialism.  The 
Amphictyony designated an intermediary space for Panhellenic politics between those 
extremes, and was, in fact, intended to do so.  Even though some states that met at the 
Amphictyony came in with a greater amount of political clout over other states, the 
power of any state in the Amphictyony was decided by the number of votes allotted to 
that state.  Interestingly enough, states bartered their way into the Amphictyony, and 
therefore were not given votes based on their political power, but based on how much the 
Amphictyony — as a political body itself — wanted that state represented.  The 
Panhellenic abilities of the Amphictyony can be emphasized in its ability to entice high-
status political players — like Sparta, as will be explored — to join for a measly number 
of Amphictyonic votes.
26
   
 
  
                                                          
25
 To illustrate this point, Perlman uses Pericles’ policy after the Persian Wars.  The 
argument suffers from the recognition by the author that the document was, indeed, a 
forgery, and can neither illustrate Panhellenism or imperialism due to that nature. 
Perlman, 6-15. 
26
 Perlman uses A. Heuss to emphasize the point that, “this is not more than a 
consciousness of belonging to a common Greek society.  There is no connection with 
Panhellenism.” These two ideas seem to negate one another.  If something is indicative of 
a common Greek society, it is then Panhellenic.  Perlman, note 1; A. Heuss, “Die 
archaische Zeit Griechenlands,” Antike und Abendland, vol. 2 (1946), 26-62. 
12 
 
The First Sacred War 
Herbert William Parke and John Boardman state that the First Sacred War was 
“an event whose historical importance [is] inadequately matched by the quality of our 
literary sources.”27  The First Sacred War, which arose out of the competition between 
Delphi and Crisa over control of the Oracle, created the structure of the Amphictyony, a 
structure designed to support the Delphian claim against the Crisaean claim.
28
  The 
Amphictyony at that time was not much more than a religious organization — with little 
political power — between two major Greek states, Athens, and Sicyon, and one regional 
power, Thessaly.
29
  The Amphictyonic decision to side with Delphi over Crisa was made 
by the Thessalians, since they dominated the votes within the embryonic form of the 
Amphictyony.
30
  Delphi had two votes in the League, but Crisa had none.   
Since the town of Crisa is situated equidistant to the sacred Delphic site that 
houses the Oracle, the stadium and amphitheater used in the Pythian Games, the 
sanctuary Athena Pronoia, and countless private and state-owned treasuries, such as the 
                                                          
27
 H.W. Parke, and John Boardman, “The Struggle for the Tripod and the First Sacred 
War,” JHS, vol. 77 (1957), 276. 
28
 According to the Merriam-Webster Geographical Dictionary, the town of Crisa later 
became known as the polis Phocis.  These two names are synonymous with the same 
space. Webster, Inc, “Crisa,” Merriam-Webster Geographical Dictionary (Springfield; 
2007).  Parke and Boardman explain that the town the Amphictyony took issue with is 
debated.  They go through the sources which deliver the historical commentary for the 
First Sacred War, and the different town names the sources refer to.  The ancient town of 
Crisa, it is concluded, was indeed the town which the Amphictyony initially fought, 
according to Parke and Boardman.  The authors use the legend of Herakles’ rape of the 
tripod to understand the First Sacred War and its origins.  They use the material culture 
and sculptures to determine the importance of the legend in comparison to the First 
Sacred War.  Parke alone states, “[I]t would not surprise us to find that the attempt of the 
Krisaians to assert their rights in opposition to the Amphictyony was seen as Herakes 
carrying off the tripod of Apollo.” Parke, Boardman, 276-282. 
29
 Scott, 71. 
30
 Petrakos, 7. 
13 
 
town of Delphi itself, the inhabitants of Crisa felt justified in making claim to the site.  
Competition for control of the site led to four sacred wars.  Aeschines says that Crisa had 
been made up of “lawless tribes, who continuously committed sacrilege against the 
Delphic shrine and sacred offerings there.”31  Diodorus Siculus and Pausanias offer 
similar accounts against the Crisaeans’ claim to the Delphic sacred space.32   
In fact, the Crisaeans probably had an equal claim to the site as did the Delphians.  
Crisa’s economic prowess in the region provides one reason for the Amphictyony’s 
involvement in the dispute between Delphi and Crisa.  Delphi had always been an 
independent city-state in the region of Phocis, according to Herbert Parke and Donald 
Wormell, while Crisa had been a dependent town in the same region.
33
  The three states 
in control of the Amphictyony sought to diminish Crisa’s economic stronghold.  Crisa 
dominated not only the fertile plain, but also the port of Cirrha on what Thucydides calls 
the Crisaean Gulf.
34
  Crisaeans finally drew the full attention of the Amphictyony when 
they enforced a toll on pilgrims making their way to Delphi.
35
  The Crisaeans’ growing 
economy threatened not only neighboring states, but neighboring regions, and provoked 
the Amphictyony to declare war on them.  In 590 BCE the Amphictyony launched a war 
that would last ten years.  She and her allies destroyed the town of Crisa and poisoned the 
inhabitants, making the site of the town unfindable as of today.
36
 
It would then make sense that the oral tradition found in the Homeric Hymn to 
                                                          
31
 Aeschin. 3.107. 
32
 Paus. 10.7.1; Diod. 9.16.1. 
33
 H.W. Parke, Donald Ernest Wilson Wormell, The Delphic Oracle, Volume I: The 
History (Oxford: 1956), 100. 
34
 Hdt. 8.32; Thuc. 1.107.3. 
35
 Petrakos, 8; Scott, 71; Parke, Wormell, 100; Matthew Dillon, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage 
in Ancient Greece (London: 1997), 50-51. 
36
 Scott, 72 
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Pythian Apollo circulated at the end of the First Sacred War, since it describes the 
Crisaean Plain as being dedicated to Apollo, a feature enforced by the Amphictyony upon 
the destruction of the town.
37
  Apollo was said to have spent considerable time searching 
the world for a place to build his temple.  Eventually he found “rocky Pythos,” otherwise 
known as Delphi.  Just as he realized he needed men to act as priests for the temple, he 
learned of a ship, then, turning himself into a dolphin, jumped onto this Cretan ship.  The 
dolphin, with help from the breath of Zeus, shook the ship until it landed on the Crisaean 
Gulf.
38
   
As soon as it docked, Apollo took his anthropomorphic form, hovering above the 
plain.  He describes Crisa as “the land of vines,” speaking to the fertile plain, and 
dedicates the land to himself in that moment.  He goes on to take the sailors of the ship to 
Delphi, called Pythos, to teach them how to be priests.  The Hymn mentions Crisa by 
name three times, clearly showing the importance of the plain and gulf to the sacred 
space dedicated to Apollo.
39
  This story conveys the delegation of the plain and Crisaean 
Gulf to the Delphian polis, and, in part, to the Amphictyony, as a result of the First 
Sacred War.   
Prior to the First Sacred War, the Pythian festival consisted of one contest: the 
                                                          
37
 Hammond, in the History of Greece to 322 BC, claims the Hymn was written in the 
eighth century BCE, but Crisaeans inhabited the Crisaean plain in the eighth century, and 
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singing of the hymn to Apollo.
40
  The festival, in its humble beginning, took place every 
eight years, but after the First Sacred War — in 582 — it took place every four years, 
marking the third year between Olympic Games.
41
  Parke and Wormell go further to 
suggest that the Pythian Games were established soon after the First Sacred War to 
celebrate the defeat of Crisa and were “held originally in the Crisaean plain where the 
stadium was marked out.”42  Others suggest that the horse races were held in the plain of 
Crisa from the time it had been dedicated.
43
 
Since both Crisa and Delphi had been located in the region of Phocis, it would 
seem most likely that Phocis would deal with the conflict herself, especially given Parke 
and Wormell’s claim that the Amphictyony at Delphi had not been established until after 
the First Sacred War — it involved itself in the conflict, then instigated a permanent force 
at Delphi from then on out, shared with Pylae.
44
  Why would two regions — Thessaly 
and Sicyon — and a prominent city-state — Athens — involve themselves in a local 
battle, in a small region, barely noticeable?  The economics and politics of Phocis should 
have never appeared on the radar of these states, but because it involved Delphi, a sacred 
Panhellenic site, the conflict mattered to other Greeks.  In fact, H. D. Westlake remarks 
that a major result of the First Sacred War was that “the Amphictyony was transferred to 
Delphi, and its reorganization welded almost the whole of northern Greece into a 
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Thessalian empire.”45  This approach differs from Parke and Wormell, who state that the 
Amphictyony either had not been created, or had no power previous to the First Sacred 
War.  Either way, at the conclusion of the First Sacred War Thessaly held strict political 
control in the region of Phocis, and therefore also had great political influence and 
control in central Greece in addition to northern Greece.   
The sacred site of Delphi, situated on the side of Mount Parnassus in central 
Greece within an area contested by Boeotia and Phocis, possessed at least two features 
that came to be seen by Greeks in general as belonging to all Greeks and not just some 
particular Greek state.  These features are religious and cultural in nature.  1) The Delphic 
Oracle functioned as the religious center of the Greek world.  Zeus was said to have sent 
two eagles from opposite ends of the world in search of the center of the Earth; they met 
at Delphi.  There Zeus dedicated the omphalos, a beehive shaped stone, as the navel of 
the Earth.
46
  2) The Pythian Games played at Delphi. 
The sacred site, however, was not under distress during the First Sacred War.  
Modern scholars agree the conflict began with tolls on pilgrims.
47
  This was hardly 
reason for involvement by an Amphictyony without a presence already, let alone other 
major states outside the region.  Because the conflict involved the Delphic site at all made 
it worthy of creating a Panhellenic association.  One can then reason that the 
Amphictyony, because it thereafter involved the sacred site, was also a Panhellenic 
association.  The Ancient Greeks themselves decided Delphic matters required both 
protection and consensus, and therefore instituted the Amphictyony after the First Sacred 
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War to protect the site against another conflict, establish a governing body to make 
decisions about the site, and act as a Panhellenic institution.  Interestingly enough, despite 
not having major votes within the Amphictyony, Delphi the polis was granted προμαντεία 




The Second Sacred War 
 By 449, as a prelude to the Archidamian War, Delphic and Phocian politics had 
become so influential in Greek society it sparked the Spartans to send 1,500 hoplites and 
10,000 allied troops to aid Doris against the Phocians.
49
  J.A.O. Larsen questions the 
purpose behind taking so many troops against such an insignificant state power, and 
concludes it must have been for geographic reasons.  He says that Sparta wanted to keep 
the route open into northern Greece.  Larsen does indicate that Sparta had sentimental 
reasons that played a part in the use of such force.  He tells that there “was also the 
additional consideration that only in connexion with the Metropolis [Doris] was Sparta 
represented in the Amphictionic League.”50   
 Despite growing tensions in Greece — particularly between Sparta and Athens — 
Sparta thought resolving the issue at Delphi and infiltrating the Amphictyony were so 
important they intensified pressure on Athens which wound up sticking its nose in 
Phocian politics.  Much like the First Sacred War, the Second Sacred War involved 
political players that would otherwise be uninterested in such a small region, but because 
of the nature of Delphi — and the Panhellenic ability of the Amphictyony located there 
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— Sparta escalated the conflict in order to maintain a voice in the Amphictyony. 
 On the heels of a Persian defeat, Athens basked in political dominance over nearly 
the whole of Greece.  Through the Delian League, Athens had built an empire, which 
they used to snatch autonomy from a great number of Greek states and regions.
51
  Sparta, 
however, took particular issue with the Athenians and their supremacy.  Phocis and 
Delphi found themselves dragged into the battle as pawns between the two superpowers.  
Athens acted to provide Phocis with the control of the sacred site, while Sparta, in a 
countermove, tried to secure Delphi’s autonomy over itself as a polis as well as the sacred 
site. 
A decade before tensions escalated with the Spartans and Phocians, Pericles had 
instituted spending considerable funds on the building up of Athens with public works 
projects, but he also spent an extensive amount on building up Delphi.
52
  Scott believes, 
“by 457 BC, Athens’s influence had extended from dominating the Delphic complex 
through dedications to political dominance and control over all its neighbors.”53  Given 
Athens’ political supremacy, not only in the Phocian region but throughout all Greece, 
the Phocians believed that with the support of the Athenians they indeed had control of 
the sacred site.
54
  No ancient author indicates whether control of the site included the 
promanteia, or if Athens reserved that for herself.   
Thucydides, and Plutarch in Pericles, both give very brief explanations of the 
Spartans marching into Phocis to reclaim the site for Delphi.  Their brevity indicates the 
Spartans had little trouble securing the site for the Delphians, but both authors mention 
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that upon leaving, the Phocians immediately reinstated their control with the help of 
Athenian military force.
55
  However, while the Spartans had been stationed there, they 
“accepted a grant of ‘promanteia’.”56   
A lack of literary and epigraphic detail at Delphi gives way to an ambiguous 
ending to the Second Sacred War.  Diodorus Siculus implies that the Delphians reclaimed 
control of the site — and the Amphictyony — when talking of a dream the Phocian 
leader Onomarchos had during the Third Sacred War, in which he reflected on the end of 
the Second Sacred War.
57
  Debates in modern scholarship engage the question of when 
the Delphians took control, whether it happened immediately following the Second 
Sacred War, or if Phocian control lasted until the very start of the Archidamian War.
58
   
Larsen, Parke, and Wormell list a series of misfortunes and skirmishes the 
Athenians suffered in politically relevant poleis and regions which stifled their political 
clout, the result being the inability to keep the Phocians in control of Delphi.
59
  None of 
these modern scholars, however, indicate how the Delphians, a much smaller power than 
the Phocians, were able to regain control.  The Delphians must have had military support 
from a power mightier than the Phocian forces, whether that had been Sparta or Doris 
remains unclear, but likely.   
The back and forth of the Second Sacred War imitated the back and forth of the 
Peloponnesian War, which came just a few decades after the conclusion of the Second 
Sacred War.  Control of the site, clearly a Panhellenic issue, occupied a great deal of time 
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and military might of the two leading powers of the time in Greece.  The importance and 
role of the Amphictyony during the Second Sacred War, however, do not make 
themselves manifest until the conclusion of the war.  Diodorus Siculus and Pausanias 
specify the war ended with the Amphictyony issuing punishments and a fine on the 
Phocians for their impiety.
60
   
The Second Sacred War was clearly fought over control of the sacred site of 
Delphi.  All players involved sought to protect the site as well as extend their own 
influence, particularly by gaining promanteia for their polis.  The Amphictyony seems to 
have little role in the whole alteration of power between the bigger players.  Delphi itself, 
then, proves to be Panhellenic, while the politics of the Amphictyony take a back seat to 
the bigger politics at hand.  With the given accounts of the Second Sacred War, 
concerning only those events in and around Phocis, this conclusion should prove valid.  
However, the missing information concerning the end of the Second Sacred War might 
hold a contrary conclusion.   
Parke and Wormell and Scott only focus on the events which took place in and 
around Phocis in the discussion of the Second Sacred War, but Larsen, interested in the 
larger federal issues, expands on the events which took place at the same time in Thessaly 
and Boeotia.  He notes that in those places there had been growing opposition to the 
Athenians.  Sparta and Athens have a similar back and forth for control of Boeotia in 
particular, ending in Boeotian autonomy from Athens with the help of Sparta.
61
  Who, 
then, could have helped the Delphians push the Phocians out of Delphic control?  Not 
only could Sparta and Doris be responsible, but also Thessaly and Boeotia.  If all had 
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joined forces against Athens, and by extension Phocis, they could have all helped expel 
the Phocians.   
Sparta, Doris, Thebes — the main Boeotian polis — and Thessaly each had a 
stake in the Amphictyony, as did Athens and Phocis.  Since the Amphictyony was split 
by its members’ different incentives in the outcome of control of the site, no ruling could 
be reached either politically or diplomatically.  Once the war ended, though, the victors 
— those states which had also suffered under Athenian imperialism — were able to band 
together and vote on a penalty which would ultimately punish the Phocians, and the 
Athenians by extension.  The Amphictyony, in that case, acted as a major political force, 
and enforced a Panhellenic penalty on members of the Amphictyony who acted unjustly.   
 
The Result of the First Two Sacred Wars 
 The sacred site of Delphi captured the hearts of all Greeks, making it 
unquestionably a pinnacle of Panhellenism.  The Amphictyony at the site had to earn 
such a status, but used its location and connection to the site to do so.  It gained political 
power in central Greece only at the conclusion of the First Sacred War, when the strength 
of the small religious organization took care to demolish a wealthy coastal polis.  That 
strength caught the attention of other major poleis and regions, which sought to join the 
Amphictyony afterwards.   
 Sparta was among the poleis trying to cling to their small influence within the 
Amphictyony at the onset of the Second Sacred War.  Sparta and Athens spent 
considerable effort and energy to promote their own self-interests at the Panhellenic site 
of Delphi, and to prove the superiority of the state which could hold the most influence 
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on site and practice promanteia.  Scholarship on the Second Sacred War focuses on the 
power hoped to gain from the site by different poleis, and barely considers the 
consequence of the war on the states involved.  It also ignores the Amphictyony’s 
influence on the outcome of the war.  Neither Parke and Wormell, Larsen, nor Scott 
consider the missing information lacking in Diodorus Siculus’ account about which states 
pushed Phocis out of Delphi, and also do not consider which of those states belonged to 
the Amphictyony.  Yet to do so would illuminate the likely possibility that the 
Amphictyony was a Panhellenic organization and that its existence mattered to Greek 
states, as much as their involvement in the association did.  By illustrating the importance 
of the Amphictyony to the Greek states themselves, one can better understand the 
potential Philip II of Macedon saw in the Amphictyony as a unifying force during the 






MACEDONIAN STRUGGLE WITH GREEK IDENTITY  
AND PHILIP II’S RESOLUTION 
 
Macedonian Participation in Greek Culture 
These descendants from Peridiccas are Greeks, as they themselves say, I myself 
happen to know and will produce proof in the following account.  It is so 
according to the Elean tribe which conducts the games at Olympia and is 
understood by the Hellenodikai. — Herodotus, Histories1 
 
 The past half century has seen this section of Herodotus come under fire from the 
leading Ancient Macedonian scholars.  Herodotus’s statement that the Macedonians are 
Greek and his specific clause, “I can prove it,” are still a major point of contention, with 
neither side giving even a little.  Eugene Borza and Nicholas Hammond argue back and 
forth the validity of Herodotus’s account, particularly concerning the Argive origins that 
Alexander I of Macedon claimed that he participated in the 476 Olympic Games.  
Herodotus retells that Alexander I used his Argive ancestry to qualify to participate in the 
Games.  If the tale proved true it would provide Alexander I, his house, and Macedonia 
with Greek heritage.  Borza believes that Herodotus was not to be trusted in regard to the 
ethnicity of the Macedonians, while Hammond believes Herodotus to be reliable on this
                                                          
1Ἓλληνας δὲ εἶναι τούς ἀπὸ Περδίκκεω γεγονότας, κατά περ αύτοὶ λέγουσι, αὐτός τε οὓτω 
τυγχάνω ἐπιστάμενος καὶ οἱ τὸν ἐν Ὀλυμπίῃ διέποντες αγῶνα Ἑλληνοδίκαι οὓτω ἓγνωσαν 
εἶναι.  Hdt. 5.22. 
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topic; their difference in opinion polarized scholars and scholarship thereafter.  The 
argument is worth considering in its entirety, but in the end, this chapter takes the same 
stance W. Lindsay Adams does, “the point of the story is not that it is true, but that 
Alexander I used it to identify his Greek ethnicity.”2  Beyond that, the Greeks themselves 
use Herodotus’s account to substantiate later claims to involve Macedonian participants 
in the Greek games.   
One scholar of Late Antiquity, Èric Rebillard, offers a perspective of identity 
which can be applied to this instance of Macedonian identity.  Rebillard examines 
Christian identities, and the distinction between Christians and non-Christians, but his 
sociological theories concerning identity imitate the polarity of cultural identity of the 
Macedonians between Greek and non-Greek.
3
  In the case of the Macedonians’ Greek-
ness, Macedonians have fluid identities, claiming Greek status when it suits them, and 
non-Greek status when it does not.  The Greeks do the same for the Macedonians: they 
claim the Macedonians when they need their resources or help, but refuse to claim them 
as Greek at other times when it proves convenient.   
Borza questions the validity of Herodotus’ story — even going so far to say that 
Herodotus had been persuaded of the truthfulness of the tale by the Macedonian royal 
house while he was there — by bringing up several factors which make the story seem 
improbable.
4
  His argument depends on factors that cannot be known, mainly the age of 
Alexander I in 476, the year in which he was supposed to have participated in the Games.  
Borza makes an interesting argument, however, about the age of Alexander I in that year.  
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He says that Alexander I could have participated in those Games, not as a Greek, but as a 
man with a service record against the Persians during the Persian Wars, but claims 
Alexander I would have been much too old by then to actually compete as a sprinter.  
Therefore it was highly unlikely that Alexander I participated as a non-Greek during 
those Games.
 5
  Borza’s argument offers a substantial alternative to Herodotus’s account, 
but, while compelling, is not inherently more reasonable than Herodotus’s own version.   
Hammond trusts Herodotus’ account linking Alexander I to an ancestor, 
Perdiccas, providing a way for the Macedonian King to participate in the 476 Games, and 
uses Thucydides as a second source on the story.
6
  Thucydides, a critic of Herodotus and 
therefore unlikely to take this story at face value, connects Alexander I to Perdiccas, as a 
man originally from Agros.
7
  It seems very likely that by the time Thucydides proceeded 
with the story, Macedonians would have been participating in Olympic Games — and the 
Pythian Games — for almost a hundred years.  He most likely received the story not from 
Herodotus, but as common knowledge, since the Macedonians probably participated in 
the Games during Thucydides’ lifetime.8   
In addition to Alexander I, the Macedonian royal house produced one other 
potential games participant, Archelaus.  A late source comes from Solinus and explains 
that Archelaus took part in both the Olympic and Pythian Games.
9
  Adams addresses the 
controversy surrounding this source and its reliability, saying the main criticism of the 
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source is its late arrival.
10
  Again Borza and Hammond argue the validity of the source, 
Borza claiming it to be too late to be trusted, while Hammond sees no reason to dismiss 
the story or the source.
11
  The account does not have a more substantial basis than 
Herodotus’s account of Alexander I, and is only relevant if Alexander I did not 
participate in Games.  If Alexander I did not participate, but Archelaus did, the source is 
important since it implies Archelaus did not have to prove his Greek heritage.   
Regardless of whether Alexander I or Archelaus participated in the Games — 
whether the Argive heritage had been fabricated or not — by the time of Philip II, 
Macedonians had participated in the Games.  Interestingly enough, Borza steps back from 
attacking Herodotus’s account about Alexander I to say that if the account had been truth, 
Alexander I suffered from the fact that he had to prove his heritage, something no other 
Greek would have to do.  This, Borza suggests, makes him and Macedonia sub-Greek, a 
conclusion which leads to two different but significant conclusions.  First, either 
Alexander I or some other royal Macedonian “proved” their Greek heritage before Philip 
II; or second, Philip II participated in the games without having to prove his heritage, 
since all Greeks assumed his Greek heritage.  Borza daringly states, “No Spartan or 
Athenian or Corinthian or Argive felt constrained to prove to the others that he and his 
family were Hellenes.”12  If that were the case, and the account in Herodotus about 
Alexander I was inaccurate, then Philip II was accepted as Greek to the Greeks, just like 
these other states.  In fact, if the Herodotus account is false, it is more likely that the 
Macedonians were considered Greek, since they competed in the games but never had to 
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prove it.  Adams argues that there “is no account of [Philip II’s] having to prove his 
Greek ethnicity.”13 
 Borza concedes that “the Macedonian royal house that in some respects would 
become quite highly Hellenized by the time of Philip II and Alexander the Great found 
itself in the early to mid-fifth century having to plead with Greeks that it was of Greek 
descent.”14  That statement could only be true if Borza believed the Herodotean account, 
which he clearly argues against.  Either the Herodotean account is accurate, Alexander I 
successfully proved his Greek heritage, and participated in the Games as a Greek; or 
Borza is correct in arguing that Alexander I did not participate in the Games, and 
therefore either Archelaus or Philip II participated in the games without having to prove 
their heritage, assuming the Greeks took one or the other to be Macedonian and Greek.   
Alexander I creeps back up again to complicate matters further. The Greeks — 
led supposedly by the Athenians — gave Alexander I an epithet which suggests a 
distancing between themselves and the Macedonian: the Philhellene.
15
  Borza and 
Hammond give two interesting yet differing purposes for the epithet.  Borza hits the main 
point directly, Philhellene “is a title reserved for non-Greeks.”16  There seems no getting 
around the probability that the epithet gives the most accurate assessment of Alexander 
I’s Greek-ness, except that Hammond and Griffith provide evidence for another 
explanation.  They point to the fact that the sources that use this epithet are late, leading 
to the conclusion that “it came into use to distinguish Alexander from his greater 
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successor of the same name.”17  They go on to say that the use of epithets is common in 
the Hellenistic period for “homonymous kings.”18  The consensus among scholars is that 
Hammond and Griffith are mistaken, and the more common belief is that the epithet is 
contemporary to Alexander I.
19
   
Given these two stories of Alexander I — that he competed in the 476 Olympic 
Games and that he had been given the epithet Philhellene during his lifetime — scholars 
tend to side with one account’s accuracy over the other, but have not considered the 
possibility that both have credibility.  Borza and Badian believe the Herodotean account 
cannot be trusted, and seem to even use the epithet to prove that Alexander I could not 
have competed in the Games, because he was merely a “friend of the Greeks.”  
Hammond and Griffith, on the other hand, argue that Alexander I competed in the 
Games, and he was only given the epithet sometime in the centuries following his death.   
However, Alexander I could have taken part in the Games and also had the epithet 
Philhellene in his lifetime.  The question is not of either being correct; both can represent 
differing perspectives on Greek identity.  Neither claim necessarily negates the other; if 
both claims are taken as historically accurate, there appears a much more complex picture 
of Macedonian heritage created for and by Macedonians during antiquity and their ability 
to “activate” Greek-ness when able, and the Greeks allowed them to “activate” it when 
they believe it convenient.  With both claims taken as having historical credibility, there 
appears a crack in the belief among Greeks that blood determines Greek-ness, a crack 
that gapes open in the next century when Isocrates issues his Panegyricus, which 
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indicates that Athens “has determined that the name ‘Greek’ no longer implies a race, but 
an intellectual capacity, and those that are called ‘Greeks’ share our culture rather than 
our common blood.”20 
 For Alexander I to hold the identities Greek and non-Greek at the same time may 
seem baffling, but, in fact, may show a more accurate picture of the complexity in 
Macedonian claims, as well as Greek claims concerning the Macedonians.  Whether 
Alexander I competed in the Games or not, Herodotus believed he did, and Alexander I 
and the Macedonian court perpetuated that claim, signifying that Greek-ness meant 
something to the Macedonians and also that Herodotus found the Greek identity of the 
Macedonians viable.  Just as the modern debate about the identity of Macedonians rages, 
so too could it have in ancient times, with some individuals — and perhaps even states — 
propagating a particular agenda. 
 Either way, the Macedonian court — as instructed by Archelaus — used Attic 
Greek, and conducted political business in Attic Greek.
21
  “This use of Greek,” Borza 
suggests, “may be a result of the process of hellenization.”22  Macedonians made a 
conscious effort in their political and diplomatic interactions to “pass” as Greek.  Borza 
continues by saying that “it would appear that there is much in Macedonian society that 
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Geographical Elements of Macedonian Distinction 
 Macedonia had different relationships with different Greek states.  While Athens, 
geographically separate from Macedonia by land, saw Macedonia in one light and reacted 
to the state in a particular way, Thessaly and Boeotia stressed much different 
relationships with Macedonia due to proximity, relationships that involved constant 
military, political, and diplomatic interventions.  Athens had military and diplomatic 
relationships with Macedonia through the impressive Athenian sea power, but Athens 
lacked the proximity to Macedonia which strengthened Macedonia’s relationships with 
Thessaly and Thebes.  Thessaly and Thebes knew the importance of protecting 
Macedonia, since their proximity made them a target if Macedonia fell to non-Greeks.  
These relationships during the fourth century BCE instigated a perfect storm of events 
that would lead eventually to Alexander the Great’s conquest, the chief catalyst being 
Philip II’s adolescent experience and his relationship with the Theban political and 
military giants, Epaminondas and Pelopidas.   
In addition to relationships, however, Macedonia — and in turn, the Greek states 
— faced challenges from powers to its sides during the reign of Amyntas III.  These 
attacks illustrate the geographic complexity of Greek interests in Macedonian territory.  
The position of Macedonia at the top of the peninsula makes it both a geographic 
gateway into Greece from the north and a geographic shield against attacks and non-
Greek influence.  Much the same as examining Alexander I’s experience as both Greek 
and non-Greek, examining Macedonia spatially results in labeling the territory as Greek 
and non-Greek, in that she was controlled by the culturally fluid, while at the same time 
she possessed materials essential to the Greek economy (namely timber) and was the first 
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line of defense against attacks.  Greeks could not afford to lose Macedonian space — 
essentially the mouth of a funnel — to unstable societies.  Athens learned this lesson 
when she required timber and intelligence from Macedonia during the Persian Wars — 
leading to Alexander I’s Philhellene title to begin with.  Even Thessaly’s attachment to 
Macedonia could really be boiled down, again, to their proximity, suggesting that if 
Macedonia fell to non-Greeks, Thessaly would be next.  Spatial politics cannot be 
discounted, since they intertwine with the cultural politics of the region. 
 Macedonia struggled to remain a power at all from the assassination of Archelaus 
in 399 to the accession of Philip II in 359.
24
  Archelaus had brought even further Greek-
ness to Macedonia, and incorporated Greek culture into everyday Macedonian life.  “The 
creation,” Borza states, “of an impressive Macedonian center at Pella was, as we have 
seen, not only a political and military innovation, but also a cultural statement.”25  
Archelaus made a conscious effort to establish Macedonia as a Greek epicenter.  Borza 
and Hammond and Griffith point out that Archelaus’ purpose for the conscious changes 
toward Greek culture do not come from Archelaus’ desire to become a Greek state.26   
While that is probably the case, Archelaus’ effort made it much easier for Macedonia to 
actually become a Greek state later on during Philip’s reign.   
The period starts with five different kings taking command from 399 to 393.
27
  
Orestes, Archelaus’ son and a minor, had been named to the throne with a regent, 
                                                          
24
 The second date comes from the chapter in HM vol. 2, “A Period of Instability, 399-
359.” Other dates, such as 360, come from an ambiguous date of Philip II’s accession due 
to confusion in royal succession, and Philip’s acting as regent in the interim. Borza points 
to archaeological evidence which suggests a 360 date, but the traditional date of 359 will 
be used, since it is the standard and most accepted. Borza, 200.  
25
 Borza, 171. 
26
 Borza, 171; Hammond, Griffith, 148-149. 
27
Diod. 14.37,84.6,89.2,15.60; Hammond, Griffith, 168; Borza, 178. 
32 
 
Aeropus, who “usurped the throne.”28  The years ruled by Aeropus (398/7-395/4) saw 
major changes in the way the Macedonians dealt with other Greek states.
29
  The Spartans, 
led by Agesilaus, sought to expand their hegemony at the time by taking on the Persians.  
To do so required the Spartans to tromp through Thessaly and Macedonia, a prospect 
appreciated by neither the Thessalians nor Macedonians, who rebelled against the Spartan 
army, but lost the battle and were “forced to make a treaty with Sparta.”30  The 
relationship between the Thessalians and Macedonians in this period would develop over 
the next fifty years to become an alliance, with the two states protecting one another’s 
interest in several political and military efforts.   
Aeropus died in 394, and in 393 Amyntas III succeeded to the throne.  The year 
between them saw two other kings take power with no significant happenings other than 
the indication of instability within the state.
31
  Amyntas would remain in power until 369.  
For the entire reign of Amyntas III, Macedonia was pinched between Illyria and the 
Chalcidice.  Amyntas tried to prevent a growing conflict between Macedonia and the 
Illyrians with a marriage to Eurydice, an Illyrian princess.
32
  They had three sons: 
Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip, but the marriage alliance did not keep the Illyrians out 
of Macedon, and by 393/2 the Illyrians had invaded.
33
  Amyntas turned to Olynthus, the 
main force within the Chalcidian League, for aid, and offered them land which bordered 
theirs, since between 393 and 391, Amyntas had signed a peace treaty with the 
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  The treaty stated that the peace was between Amyntas, himself, 
and the Chalcidian League, that both participants would be allies for fifty years, and they 
would defend the other against “warlike intent.”35   
Olynthus and the Chalcidian League had a complex history, attributed to the 
development of the League.  Athens long before had sent colonists to the Chalcidic 
peninsula, who established colonies among the already developed kingdoms of the 
Thracians there.
36
 Olynthus belonged to the Thracian tribe, the Bottiaeans, until 479, after 
its inhabitants had been displaced from Macedonia until the beginning of the Greco-
Persian Wars.
37
  The Greek colonies, which remained close to the coastline, and the 
Thracian tribes, which took up areas inland, by 432, had formed a “genuine federal state,” 
with Olynthus as the capital — the Chalcidian League.38  “It was one of the earliest 
federal states to admit cities which did not belong to the same ethnic group as the original 
founders.”39 
 Alliances within Greece were made even more complicated by the King’s Peace 
(387/6).  Macedonia had been left out of the Peace due to Spartan belief that she was not 
Greek, leaving her vulnerable, without a solid alliance with the rest of the Greek states, 
and without the protection of Spartan hegemony.  Amyntas maneuvered himself and 
Macedonia, but lost autonomy to the Illyrian tribes in the 380s, after his second battle 
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Help against the Illyrians undoubtedly came from Olynthus, because of the 
alliance between the League and Macedonia, but also from the seemingly unlikely 
source, the Thessalians — more specifically Larissa — who agreed to side with and aid 
their ally once again after having supported the state a decade earlier against the Illyrians, 
and who reinstated Amyntas on the Macedonian throne.
41
  Unfortunately for the 
Macedonians, the Olynthians proved to be as big a danger to the Macedonian state as the 
Illyrians.  Xenophon and Diodorus both give lists of Macedonian cities taken by the 
Olynthians.
42
  The weakness of the Macedonian state was exemplified by the weakness of 
Amyntas himself, illustrated by his pleading for aid from other major Greek powers.
43
  
By 383 the Macedonian hope rested on an alliance with Sparta, since Athens and Thebes 
showed interest in allying with the Olynthians.   Sparta — with nominal help from the 
less accomplished Macedonian and Thessalian troops — immediately put an end to the 
Olynthian threat in 382 with the siege of Potidaea.
44
 
The 380s demonstrated a constant change in Greek consciousness concerning the 
Macedonians, except for one state which stood by the Macedonians throughout it all.  
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The Thessalians saw the Macedonians not only as allies, but as kindred spirits — 
threatened by the same states and tribes, abused in the same way by more powerful Greek 
states, and peripheral.  Amyntas and the Macedonians, however, had different 
relationships with different Thessalian powers.  Amyntas and Jason of Pherae engaged in 
power struggles over Macedonian territory, but the Larissans aided Macedonia in all 
incidents with neighboring threats.   
Henry Dickenson Westlake makes the point that although the Thessalians had an 
anti-Spartan policy in 381, they joined the Spartans to fight the Olynthians.  He says, 
“This reversal of policy on the part of the Thessalians can be attributed to no more 
definite reason than a desire to be on good terms with the power which was temporarily 
supreme.”45  Another reason may have just have easily been that the Thessalians allied 
themselves continually with the Macedonians and by default — in this instance — the 
Spartans.  The Thessalians likely saw the Chalcidian League as a threat to their well-
being just as much as it was to the Macedonians, since the next destination of conquest 
after Macedonia was Thessaly.  This truth inherently tied Macedonia and Thessaly 
together in efforts to keep foreign threats out.  In fact, the two were more unified than 
many other Greek states due to their geographic locations and political monarchies.   
The symbiotic relationship between the two states would soon favor one over the 
other when Jason of Pherae became ταγός.  The result made Amyntas subject to Jason, 
since Jason sought to create his own hegemony in Greece by means of Macedonian 
timber and a naval fleet rivaling Athens’.46  With Olynthus put in check by Spartan 
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military dominance, Amyntas — and Macedonia — could breathe easier without the 
constant threat to either side.  Sparta sought no recorded award for its efforts in northern 
Greece, and left the Macedonians and Thessalians to continue in whatever manner they 
saw fit.
47
  One decade following the Spartan defeat of Olynthus, Amyntas had joined 
forces with the anti-Spartan Second Athenian League.
48
   
In 371, Amyntas found himself in an interesting position between Athens and 
Sparta which continues to baffle scholars.  Aeschines recounts the event, saying that 
Amyntas held a vote — he had sent a delegate to vote on his behalf — leading scholars to 
cope with the suggestion that Macedonia had been represented as a Greek state.
49
  
Hammond and Griffith, Borza, and Cargill all attribute the moment to a fluke or 
misrepresentation by Aeschines.
50
  The German scholar Geyer “believed that Macedon 
was taking its place at the conference as a state on a par with, and equal in rights with the 
Greek powers.”51  With the issue so contested it remains hard to argue that Amyntas was 
seen by the Greeks as a Greek at that moment — especially considering the benefits 
Athens would reap for having given Macedonia a charitable seat at the table — but it 
remains hard to argue that with a vote in this instance, Macedonia’s status as a Greek 
state, which participated in Greek politics, would seem more solidified had she been 
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given a vote in another Council — such as the Amphictyony. 
Macedonia’s relationships with different Greek states show the complexity of her 
Greek-ness during the reign of Amyntas.  The relationship between Macedonia and 
Sparta swung back and forth between allies and enemies.  With Macedonia left out of the 
King’s Peace, it would seem Sparta did not acknowledge Macedonia’s Greek-ness, but 
then again, Sparta came to support Macedonia against the Olynthians and the Chalcidian 
League, and brought Macedonia under the protection of Sparta, arguably for the benefit 
of keeping the territory out of non-Greek hands.  Athens similarly showed Macedonia 
disinterest — hatred at times — and then used Macedonia as a tool to get what she 
wanted, at the expense of including Amyntas in Greek politics.  Greek states typically 
aligned themselves with others states under the assumption that their state would benefit 
politically and economically, so alliances switched from year to year.  Macedonia was no 
different, but the Greek states saw that she had to be brought into the Greek system more 
and more, leading to her protection by Sparta, and finally a say in Greek politics.   
 
The Theban Hostage 
Amyntas died in 370/69, leaving three sons by Eurydice, the oldest of which, 
Alexander II, took the throne.
52
  Alexander looked to keep Macedonia intact, while his 
mother, Eurydice, lusted for power, and sought to overthrow her son.  To maintain order 
in Macedonia, Alexander had to invest in diplomatic relationships which included 
sending his brother Philip off, possibly twice, as a political hostage.  History has nearly 
lost the entirety of the early life of Philip II of Macedon, but fortunately an invaluable 
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tidbit remains: that he was used as a diplomatic bargaining chip — a hostage — between 
Macedonia and Thebes from 368/7 to 365.
53
  Both Justin and Diodorus refer to 
Alexander’s struggles with the Illyrians once again, during which Justin says Alexander 
gave up Philip to the Illyrians as tribute to avoid war.
54
  Alexander surely did give tribute 
to the Illyrians to keep from war, but whether Philip was taken to Illyria is not certain.
55
   
Alexander inherited a struggling state from his father, one threatened by Illyrians 
and, soon after his ascension, the Thessalians.  Jason of Pherae had been cut down by 
seven assassins, and his nephew Alexander of Pherae looked to expand Thessaly into 
Macedonian territory.
56
  Larissa looked to gain back its independence from Pherae, and 
asked Alexander and his Macedonians to join forces with them.
57
  With the threat of 
Thessalian hegemony curbed after the death of Jason, Alexander of Pherae still looked to 
control all Thessaly and Macedonia.
58
  Plutarch even states that Alexander of Pherae was 
in open war with many Thessalian cities, and plotting against them.
59
   
Alexander of Macedon took it upon himself to act as a protectorate for Larissa, 
however, and made her a Macedonian canton to keep her from Pherae.  The battle for 
central and northern Greek territory would have continued, but a peacemaker entered the 
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territory, restored Larissa to independence, sent Alexander of Macedon home, and kept 
Alexander of Pherae in check.
60
  The impressive statesman Pelopidas, from Thebes, 
commanded order in the surrounding regions, a window into the Theban hegemony he 
had then begun to build. 
Alexander of Macedon had only to look back to Macedonia for more trouble, that 
coming from his mother and her lover, Ptolemy.
61
  Ptolemy — a likely member of the 
Macedonian royal family, the Argeadae — and Alexander wrestled for control of the 
Macedonian state, which led to the bringing in of a third party for resolution, coming 
from Pelopidas making his way up the Greek countryside.
62
  For his work in undertaking 
the issue in Macedonia, he took 30 sons of powerful men as hostages, among them, 
Philip.
63
  Plutarch — a native Boeotian, and therefore a source nearly deifying Pelopidas 
— explains that Pelopidas had not only shown his own and Theban power by taking the 
hostages, but also the trust the other Greeks had in his justice.
64
  Given the treatment of 
Philip by the Thebans, Plutarch probably was not far off base.
65
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Philip during those three years in Thebes gathered, for the first time, valuable 
intel from inside the political house of the Thebans, and he would bring those Greek 
concepts back to Macedonia — the simultaneously Greek and non-Greek state — and 
formally incorporate Theban political and military practices to Hellenize the entire state.  
He built upon the legacy of cultural assimilation started by Archelaus to create a Greek 
state.  Since he did this with Theban practices — a state constantly at odds with Athens 
and the Peloponnese — it is no wonder the Athenians and Spartans could not look upon 
Macedonia as truly Greek, since her definitive Greek substantiation developed from 
Theban — not Athenian or Spartan — influence.  Since the Theban reputation was 
suspect, Philip’s and Macedonia’s reputation had to be as well.   
The political structure of Boeotia, the region to which Thebes belonged, had 
undergone severe changes just a decade previous to Philip’s arrival.66  Unlike the 
monarchical political structure in Macedonia, Boeotia had an oligarchical representative 
government based on a republican constitution.
67
  But with the creation of the King’s 
Peace, Sparta had taken it upon herself to break up the Boeotian Confederacy.
68
   
 Sparta saw Thebes as a threat to her hegemony — with good reason, since 
Pelopidas was about to make a presence throughout all central and northern Greece — all 
the while Thebes sought her own hegemony and the expulsion of Spartans from Boeotia, 
but more importantly, from Thebes, under the direction of the Theban official Pelopidas.  
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In 379 the Thebans created and executed an elaborate plan to assassinate the Spartan 
administrators, polemarchoi, in Thebes.
69
  Pelopidas rallied the troops and the Theban 
people to expel the whole Spartan garrison.
70
  Once done, an assembly was called to elect 
new Boeotarchs.
71
   
 Thebes looked to take control of the region with the use of its allotted Boeotarchs, 
four in total, to “revive the Confederacy,” thus propelling Thebes to the status of other 
city-states which dominated their respective regions, while she also looked to create a 
Boeotian hegemony.
72
  The votes by the Theban Boeotarchs to go into battle cast light 
onto the developing tensions and power struggles between the leading forces within 
Greece, in particular Sparta, Thebes, Athens, and Pherae.
73
  Sparta sought to keep the 
Boeotians (and Athenians) in check with several short campaigns into Boeotia.  A 
decisive battle at Tegyra in 375, however, showed the elite training of a new military 
powerhouse, when the Sacred Band of Thebes, under the command of Pelopidas, 
defeated handily the Spartan forces sent to the Boeotian city Orchomenus and the 
neighboring region Locris.
74
   
 By 371 two important events took place: the formal acceptance of the Common 
Peace and the Battle of Leuctra.  The Spartans and Thebans had been fighting skirmishes, 
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with participation from allied powers for each state, and were locked in an endless match 
for hegemonic prowess when the Athenians, who were worn from fighting themselves for 
the Thebans, agreed to negotiate a peace and Sparta acquiesced.  Xenophon relates an 
interesting element of the peace, saying that the Thebans wished the peace to read 
“Boeotians” rather than “Thebans,” but the Spartans refused.75  The Thebans, led by 
Epaminondas, wanted the peace to reflect that Boeotia and Thebes were synonymous, but 
just like the near hegemony in Thessaly with Pherae, other Boeotians did not find Thebes 
to be an adequate representor of the entire region.
76
  Without the change, however, the 
Thebans left Sparta without a peace.  Athens and Sparta, however, began immediately to 
fulfill their terms of the peace between the two.
77
 
Since the Common Peace did not settle the matter, especially for the Thebans, the 
two states continued fighting.  Thebans were left to defend the principles and territory of 
Thebes by themselves.  Seven representatives voted on whether to engage in battle with 
Sparta at Leuctra, a Boeotian town.  Epaminondas directed the vote for battle, which 
ended in a four to one win for the Theban general.
78
  Epaminondas led the Thebans into 
the Battle at Leuctra and crushed the Spartan will.  The Thebans turned to Jason of 
Pherae, who sent cavalry which ultimately settled a peace between Sparta and Thebes, 
essentially ending the Spartan hegemony.  Jason made his way back home through Phocis 
and celebrated his diplomatic success at Delphi and the Pythian festival.
79
  With Spartan 
power dismantled, and with the assassination of Jason soon after, a power vacuum 
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resulted which both Athens and Thebes tried to fill.
80
  Thessaly would also make a claim 
for hegemonic power, but with Jason out of the picture, Thessaly was left without a 
powerful leader capable of creating a Thessalian hegemony.   
371 marked the end of Spartan advancement into central Greek territory, and the 
strengthening of Boeotian alliances between the Phocians, Aetolians, and Locrians.
81
  In 
370, the Thebans, instead, became the instigators, and moved into the Peloponnese to 
attack, with more alliances added: Eleans, Argives, and Arcadians.
82
  Larsen indicates 
that “the Arcadian Confederacy was a product of the anti-Spartan revolt following the 
defeat of Sparta at Leuctra in 371.”83  The Sacred Band being the elite fighting force — 
above the Spartans — now looked to bring the fight to Sparta with the help of her newly 
formed and strengthened alliances in the Peloponnese. 
With the cities — namely Mantinea and Tegea — of the Arcadian League united 
both with Thebes and against Sparta, Sparta stood little chance.
84
  Sparta looked to 
remain a force at Mantinea, leaving the Arcadians to rely on help from the Thebans —the 
Sacred Band led by Epaminondas — who pushed the Spartans back to Spartan territory, a 
threat to Sparta herself.  As a final task, the Thebans released Messenia from under 
Spartan control, essentially ending Spartan “helotage.”85  Not only had Thebes ended 
Spartan hegemony at that point, they crippled the state, leaving them with virtually no 
power over anyone but themselves.  This venture into the Peloponnese by the Thebans 
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and Epaminondas solidified the status of Thebes and Boeotia as hegemon of Greece.  
This is the environment under which, two years later, Philip had been taken in to be 
educated by both Epaminondas and Pelopidas in the house of Pammenes.
86
 
In 368, while Philip remained in Theban hands, a fascinating gathering (possibly 
an impactful moment on Philip) took place between Sparta and Thebes at Delphi, which, 
having been hijacked by a meddling Persian ambassador, failed.
87
  The next year another 
peace conference took place at Susa.  Pelopidas, again showing off his diplomatic skills, 
arranged for the official peace between Sparta and Thebes — with the help of Persian 
officials, which failed as the last.
88
  Sparta and Athens, “the traditional great powers,” felt 
Thebes’ growing supremacy, and therefore could not submit.89  Even with peace 
constantly at bay for the major Greek powers, Pelopidas worked constantly to try to 
resolve the conflicts through diplomacy.   
In addition to providing means for peace between Athens, Sparta, and Thebes, 
Pelopidas worked to instigate diplomatic relations between Thebes and the threatening 
Alexander of Pherae.  While in the midst of a diplomatic mission in Thessaly in 367, 
Pelopidas was taken by Alexander. Two Theban missions advanced to retrieve the 
Theban commander, the first of which failed due to Athenian involvement, and the 
second, while successful, came with conditions: the Thebans had to leave Thessaly, and 
not leave any military or political presence.
90
  Hornblower comments, “The original 
mission of Pelopidas was speculative … and was intended, surely, not so much to make 
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Thessaly into a Boiotian province … as to win as many friends and followers as 
possible.”91  Pelopidas feared the strength of Alexander, just as he had feared the strength 
of Jason, and worked to keep his hegemony alive, while at the same time implementing 
diplomatic tactics rather than military ones.  Philip would use this tactic later, particularly 
during the Third Sacred War, and find it equally ineffective, and turn to military control, 
just as the Thebans had to do. 
Hammond and Griffith make bold claims about Philip’s time spent in Thebes, 
giving much credence to the Thebans, particularly Epaminondas and Pelopidas.  They 
admit doing so cannot be helped.  The influence of these generals on Macedonia is 
evidenced through similar military strategies and tactics.
92
  Hammond and Griffith pose 
the question that if Philip “had spent these same years as a hostage in Athens instead of in 
Thebes, free to be a pupil in action at its most sophisticated, should we perhaps have seen 
a king more serious and more enlightened than the one whom we do see presently?”93 It 
is an interesting thought, but the reality is that if Philip spent the time in Athens, even at 
its height, he would not have had a place in history like he does now.  Philip’s greatness 
rests on his own ability and intellect — as a teenager! — to absorb the tactics of the state 
employed by the Thebans, and also on the Thebans for taking the time to mentor the 
young Macedonian.   
Hammond and Griffith also make the claim about Plutarch that he “writes 
sensibly that Philip learned a lot from Epaminondas — a lot about war.  As for arête and 
the qualities that made up the arête of that great man, Philip was incapable of profiting 
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from the association.”94  No stone should be cast at Plutarch for such a belief, since 
Plutarch, as a Boeotian, finds Epaminondas and Pelopidas to exude arête, enough so that 
not many can compare.
95
  Few can fault Plutarch’s patriotism, since all historians suffer 
from biased conclusions of such a nature, but that is not to say it is any less wrong.  In 
addition to military strategies, Philip learned arête from the Thebans.  The Greek term 
arête itself describes a person possessing moral fiber, something built into their character, 
something that cannot be learned.   
In a sense, Philip was then born with arête, but his time as a Theban hostage 
brought out the trait, which manifested itself in a very Theban way.  Hammond and 
Griffith accurately explain that given Philip’s “devotion to war,” the impact of 
Epaminondas as a military leader is obvious.
96
  What scholars fail to mention is the 
relationship between Philip and Pelopidas, and the Theban traits instilled in the young 
man by the equally important Theban general.  Perhaps Philip learned military tactics 
from Epaminondas alone, but more likely he learned them from both Epaminondas and 
Pelopidas in tandem.  Just as importantly, however, Philip became Hellenized through his 
experience in Thebes, and studied the political maneuvers of Pelopidas across Greek 
states and through different leagues and councils.  Philip undoubtedly gained invaluable 
knowledge concerning the interworkings of Greek politics, including that of the 
Amphictyonic Council.   
Westlake’s article “The Sources of Plutarch’s Pelopidas” shines a light on the 
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historical frustration of Plutarch’s library.97  Plutarch had countless Boeotian sources 
from which he pulled the accounts he saw fit to tell his story of Pelopidas — and left 
alone those that he did not.  Unfortunately his bias against Philip kept him from retelling 
all pertinent information for Philip’s time in Thebes, and so the majority of literary 
evidence about the relationship Philip had with Pelopidas and Epaminondas comes from 
a limited amount Plutarch remarks on the matter.  Evidence, however, could easily come 
from Philip’s apparent imitation of these generals.  That imitation should count as 
historical evidence enough, since the practices are not found in Macedonia before Philip.   
 
Rise of Philip of Macedon 
During the time when Philip had been held in Thebes, Macedonia suffered from 
drastic changes in the royal house.  In 367, Alexander II was assassinated, the lead 
suspect being Ptolemy.
98
  The conspiracy against Alexander raises questions, but 
nevertheless, Ptolemy succeeded to the throne, with the strong-willed Eurydice by his 
side.
99
  The usurpation of the throne by Ptolemy split the kingdom, half of which would 
remain loyal to a proper successor of Alexander II.  Pausanias proved to be that 
successor, though through what blood lines remains unclear.
100
  Athens — still in a power 
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struggle with Thebes for hegemony — helped Ptolemy to rid Macedonia of Pausanias.101  
Pelopidas, with Philip still in his care, invaded Macedonia and subjected Ptolemy to 
“humiliating” terms.102   
Ptolemy, in 365, lost power to Perdiccas III.  “It is uncertain whether Ptolemy fell 
as the result of a plot against him by Perdiccas, or whether Perdiccas came of age, 
achieved his kingship and then disposed of [Ptolemy],” since Ptolemy may have been 
serving as his regent.
103
  Athens and Thebes not only fought for political control of 
Macedonia — through supporting and appointing one king over another — but also for 
control of Macedonian economic commodities, mainly timber for shipbuilding.  
Perdiccas decided to provide Thebes with the timber over Athens, further infuriating the 
Athenians.
104
  Later hatred for the Macedonians by the Athenians could stem from this 
transition from Ptolemy to Perdiccas, as well as the continuing fight for Amphipolis.   
That same year Philip was returned home.
105
  By 364 he had been given a τάξις, 
or fleet, and the opportunity to protect an area, Amphaxitis.
106
  During this time Philip 
developed solid relationships with the military men he served with, as well as new 
military tactics.  After spending time with the Theban military, Philip knew the benefits 
of the phalanx. To improve on the Theban formation he armed the infantry with the 
sarissa, a remarkabe long pike to be wielded by hoplites.
107
  While Perdiccas was caught 
between Athens and Thebes for political control of the Macedonian economy, Philip had 
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time to build an elite fighting force of his own.  The time between Philip’s return home 
and the beginning of his reign as king proved to be invaluable in creating something 
Macedonia lacked for centuries now, an army capable of competing with the rest of the 
Greeks.  “The same soldiers,” Griffith asserts, “when acting in conditions which called 
for endurance over rougher terrain were armed probably with the conventional hoplite 
spear and shield and were capable of marching far and fast.”108 
In addition to being used by both Athens and Thebes for purposes not 
Macedonian, Macedonia also faced yet another threat from the Illyrians.  In 359, 
Perdiccas set out to fight a “pitched battle” with the Illyrians, one in which he lost his 
life, along with 4,000 of his men.
109
  Hammond claims that with the death of Perdiccas, 
“the collapse of the Macedonian kingdom seemed to be almost inevitable.”110  The heir to 
the throne was Perdiccas’s young son, Amyntas, and the Illyrians saw their chance to take 
the whole of Macedon.  Athens backed one pretender to the throne, while the Thracians 
of Chalcidice backed another.
111
   
Philip — whether acting as regent to the boy Amyntas, or as outright king — 
found himself surrounded on all sides by wolves ready to pounce, awaiting the fall of 
Macedon.  To solve his problem, Hammond and Griffith say Philip needed time, and the 
way to gain time was through diplomacy.  Like Pelopidas, and probably learned from 
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Pelopidas, “diplomacy was destined to be Philip’s favourite field of action.”112  By some 
miracle, Philip and his ambassadors managed to negotiate a temporary peace with those 
on every side of the kingdom, including a peace with Athens over Amphipolis.
113
  Athens 
had sent a military force to instate a puppet king, Argaeus, on the Macedonian throne.  
When the Athenian force realized the Macedonians would support Philip as king, they 
made their way back to their ships to go home.  Philip stopped them and held them 
prisoner.
114
  Ellis counters Demosthenes’ account with the claim that “the withdrawal 
from Amphipolis and the deliberately generous treatment of the prisoners taken near 
Methone had advertised the attractions of Philip as ally rather than enemy.”115  Philip 
now had the time he needed to build an army — and kingdom — based on the 
fundamentals of the Theban Sacred Band. 
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THE THIRD SACRED WAR, ATHENIAN BIAS  
AND RHETORIC 
 
Origins of a Third Sacred War 
Buckler begins his account of the Third Sacred War — the only monograph in 
English on the matter — with the Peace of 362 after the battle of Mantineia.  He explains 
that the battle had been the end of the Theban hegemony without making reference to 
Epaminondas, since the battle also ended the life of Epaminondas.  Much like the death 
of Jason, the general’s death led to the slipping of the grip Thebes had on the rest of 
Greece.  “Never again,” Buckler writes, “would any single Greek state win ascendancy 
over the others.”1  Instead, it may be offered that yet another state lost hegemony — like 
Sparta had two decades earlier — and a power vacuum led to another Greek state 
climbing the ladder to hegemony: Macedonia.  Theban hegemony, though, had made its 
mark on Greek political life from then on; “federalism is the great Theban legacy to 
fourth-century and hellenistic Greece.”2 
Tensions escalated, however, not in 362, but in 364 with a series of major events.  
Buckler, like other scholars before him, underestimates the influence of Pelopidas on
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Greek matters in favor of narratives highlighting Epaminondas.  Even Xenophon favors 
the Epaminondas narrative over that of Pelopidas, saying, “there was still greater 
indecision and confusion than before in all Greece.”3  In 364, on the other hand, Thessaly 
sought autonomy from Alexander of Pherae, a noble cause in the eyes of Thebans and 
Pelopidas.  Pelopidas took up arms against Alexander of Pherae’s forces and was killed at 
the battle of Kynoskephalai.  The Thebans, avenging their fallen leader, undertook a 
second mission on Alexander, wherein he was defeated and made to join the Boeotian 
League.
4
  “The importance of this,” Hornblower believes, “was that it gave the Thebans a 
clear majority of votes in the Amphiktionic Council at Delphi.”5  The naval fleet 
Epaminondas sought to build — thus the Theban relationship with Macedonia for timber 
— halted, since forces were spread thin.6  This made way for the fall of the Theban 
hegemony in 362 when Epaminondas was killed.
7
  With Thebes and Thessaly kept in 
check, Phocis vied for power and aimed first at Delphi, an autonomous site within 
Phocis.   
After the Second Sacred War ended in 448, the Phocians controlled the Delphic 
shrine.  Not until the end of the Archidamian War — concluding with the Peace of Nicias 
in 421 — did independence come to the site.  The first two clauses of the Peace, as 
relayed by Thucydides, involved the Delphic Oracle.  The first term indicated that any 
Greek could go to any temple or games within Greece without fear.  The second term 
                                                          
3
 Xen. Hell. 7.5.27. 
4
 Diod. Sic. 15.80. 
5
 Hornblower, Greek World, 263. 
6
 Hornblower, Greek World, 264. 
7
 Epaminondas sought to build a mighty Aegean naval force to rival Athens.  This led to 
his and Pelopidas’ interest in Macedonian timber. Buckler and Beck cover the process in 
their chapter Boeotian Aulis and Greek naval bases. Buckler, Beck, 180-198. 
53 
 
specified the independence of the Delphic shrine, and that the shrine should be governed 
by the Delphians themselves.
8
  The feud between Phocis and Delphi subsided for nearly 
seventy years before it ratchetted up again in 356, starting the Third Sacred War.
9
 
Scott suggests that the Third Sacred War “‘once again,’ seems to have been 
fought over the nature of Delphi’s administration and more specifically the balance of 
power within the sanctuary.”10  Since Scott focuses mainly on the sacred site of Delphi, 
and not the politics of the cities and states surrounding the sanctuary, including the town 
of Delphi, he misses the larger context at play in Greece at the time of the Sacred War.  
While Scott is accurate in stating a power struggle erupted between the Phocians and 
Delphians for control of the site and for the Amphictyony, his claim does not account for 
the Theban and Thessalian interests in controlling the Amphictyony.  The 
“administration” of the site does not only lead to power over the sanctuary, but gives the 
state in control the position of leading power in central Greece.  The Thebans, as a central 
Greek state, knew the importance of controlling the Amphictyony in this way, as did the 
Phocians.   
Diodorus and Pausanias provide differing accounts concerning the outbreak of the 
war.  Diodorus, an anti-Phocian source, explains that the Phocian leader, Philomelus, a 
                                                          
8“τὸ δ' ἱερὸν καὶ τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ Δελφοὺς αὺτονόμους εἶναι καὶ 
αὐτοτελεῖς καὶ αὐτοδίκους καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆς ἑαυτῶν κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.” 
“The divine space and temple of Apollo at Delphi and the Delphians are to be self-
governed, by their own law, as well as taxed by their own state, and judged by their own 
judges, their earth and people, according to the customs of their state,” Thuc. 5.18. 
9
 Petrakos, 5; Petrakos gives this as the first year of the Third Sacred War. Battles did not 
start until the spring of 355 BCE. This date comes from John Buckler. Buckler, Philip II 
(Leiden; 1989), 37. 
10
 Scott, Delphi and Olympia, 124. 
54 
 
man with unusual audacity and lawlessness, took over the Delphic shrine.
11
  On the other 
hand, Pausanias states outright he does not know the truthfulness of stories he had been 
told about the outbreak, but retells the two sides that had come down to him.  One side, 
the Phocians acted, against the Amphictyony, who then imposed a fine on them; the other 
side, a fine was placed on the Phocians because of the Thessalian hatred for them.
12
   
Pausanias, while trying to remain impartial in his account, does not examine the 
possibility of the Phocian right to the sacred site.  Crisa — a city within the region of 
Phocis — lost its right to the site when it had been razed to the ground during the First 
Sacred War.  Crisa tried to implement the toll on pilgrims visiting the site, which seemed 
reasonable considering pilgrims travelled through Crisa and Phocis continually, without 
providing Phocis with due funds for maintaining the stretch.  Since Delphi remained in 
the Phocian region, Phocis had a legitimate claim to the site, but could only fight for 
control of it when the hegemonic states controlling it and the Amphictyony were 
distracted with other endeavors of stasis.  Neither ancient author acknowledges the 
entitlement Phocis had to — at very least — the Cirrhaean Plain, since it had been taken 
from the Phocians and only then dedicated to Apollo (as explored above).   
The Phocians clearly knew the best times for their intervention at Delphi.  They 
acted — and indeed cultivated the land — at a moment when they knew the great powers, 
namely Athens and Sparta, could or would not intervene.  They did, however, believe 
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they had a right to the land, since it was taken from them in the First Sacred War.  
Whether the Phocians made an attempt to seize Delphi, or acted against the Amphictyony 
— or whether the Thessalians had it out for them — the Amphictyony heard the case 
against the Phocians and deliberated to consider the initial fine of 500 talents on the 
Phocians in 357 for impiety in relation to the cultivation of the sacred plain.
13
  The 
Thebans, possibly for more power as their own dwindled, had the Amphictyony hear the 
case against Spartan impiety for attacking a Greek state during a time of peace in 382, 
and asked for a 500 talent fine on them as well.
14
  Outraged, the Spartans took up the 
Phocian cause.  Jeremy McInerney states that “the Thebans’ intentions were to isolate 
their ancient enemies from the rest of the Greek community, not to punish recent 
wrongdoing.”15  The Amphictyony took the Theban side when they voted in 357 at 
Thermopylae to place an even larger fine on the Spartans of 1000 talents at the same time 
they voted to impose the fine on the Phocians, the result being an alliance between Phocis 
and Sparta against (what each state viewed as) Amphictyonic persecution.
16
  Buckler 
examines Delphi’s ability to prosecute the Phocians at such a time, without 
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acknowledging that the Phocians probably waited until they knew they could get away 
with taking parts of their ancient land back.  “Thessaly was too distracted by civil war to 
intervene,” Buckler admits, “and Athens, an ally of Sparta, too well disposed towards 
Phokis.  Thebes was the only realistic alternative.”17  The Thebans, having been granted 
promanteia with the death of Pelopidas, had not only a vested interest, but undoubtedly 
an assumed duty, in upholding the Amphictyony and protecting the sacred site. 
Buckler remarks that the fines were unjust, since the Spartans had already been 
punished with the loss of hegemony and Theban advancements afterwards into the 
Peloponnese, and since the Phocians could not afford such a fine.   If the Phocians could 
not afford the price, the other Greek states had to have known it.  Thebes and the 
Amphictyony had to believe one of two things would happen.  First, that the fine would 
bankrupt Phocians, failing in any attempt as an opposition power to Delphi and the 
Amphictyony.  The vulnerability of the Phocians, then, would easily lead to a Theban 
take-over; second, the Phocians would fight back, starting a new sacred war.  Either way, 
the Thebans saw Phocian territory as ripe for the plucking, and as a step towards 
hegemonic power again.  Instead of attempting the diplomacy the Thebans excelled at 
before the death of Pelopidas, they sought to beat on a weaker foe.  The decision would 
ultimately lead not to their elevation to Theban hegemony, but to the rise of the 
diplomatic and military power of Macedon.   
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The Third Sacred War and Intervention of Philip II as a Greek 
 Hornblower devotes a handful of pages to the Third Sacred War, since his 
monograph spans from the end of the Persian Wars to the death of Alexander, but 
provides the most succinct commentary of the effects of the war, saying, “the importance 
of this war (355-346) can hardly be exaggerated, because it was what brought Philip into 
Greece proper.”18  Philip was brought into Greece, but what about the whole of 
Macedonia?  Many scholars make sure to distinguish between Philip’s success as a 
Greek, and the inclusion of Macedonia as a Greek state.  The distinction seems obvious 
to these scholars: Philip was Greek, but Macedonia was not.
19
   
The inherent problem with considering Philip Greek while the rest of Macedonia 
fits under the category of non-Greek, is that Philip leads the Macedonians, a man backed 
by the Macedonian people over usurpers to the throne — some of whom could have 
taken it easily if not for the Macedonian loyalty to Philip.  Philip, therefore, had to be 
Macedonian for the Macedonians to support him.  His Greek-ness, clearly unhidden from 
the Macedonians, suggests the Macedonians saw no conflict or contradiction in either his 
allegiance or his identity.  The Macedonians — particularly the Macedonian army who 
had, at the time of Philip, adopted Theban tactics — could likewise claim a Macedonian 
identity, while simultaneously claiming Greek identity.  This would tie Philip to the 
Macedonians, rather than keeping the two at odds with one another.  This circumstance 
gives more weight to reason than the deduction by scholars that a Greek led the 
Macedonian state.  From this point forward, then, when speaking of Philip as the head of 
his state — rather than as an individual — he is assumed synonymous with Macedonia.   
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Events in central Greece shadowed the events taking place in northern Greece 
between Athens, Thessaly, and Macedonia between 357 and 355.  Hammond provides a 
note linking them, “as a hostage Philip had observed the great achievements of Thebes 
and her control of the Delphic Amphictyony, and thereafter he watched the growing 
confusion from Macedonia.”20  By 356 the Phocians assembled to discuss how they 
would deal with the fine.  Philomelos, the Phocian leader, decided that the punishment 
from the Amphictyony was not only unjust, but that the seizure of the site from the 
Phocians over two centuries earlier was also unjust.
21
  Philomelos claimed the 
Amphictyony had no right to the governance of the site, since the Phocians had the right 
taken from them.
22
  He aimed to take back not only control of the site itself, but the 
governance of it, with aid from both Sparta and Athens.
23
   
Philomelos travelled to Sparta himself to recruit help.  The Spartans refused to 
send Spartan troops, but agreed to fund and supply mercenaries.
24
  They may not have 
wanted to commit to another war just yet, since their troops and funds from the state were 
probably depleted, or they felt the Phocians were willing to take on the full force of the 
Thebans and members of the Amphictyonic League themselves, with little responsibility 
to fall on the Spartan state.  Phocis then had the power to march on the sacred site of 
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Delphi, and did so in July 356, according to Buckler.
25
   
Phocis had a cruel policy against the occupants of those in or around the town of 
Delphi, which was to kill or enslave all inhabitants.  The Spartan commander 
Archidamos convinced him otherwise.
26
  The Locrians immediately engaged the 
Phocians to try to take back the sanctuary, but were pushed back.  Philomelos hurled the 
taken Locrian prisoners from the cliffs of the mountain, a punishment enforced on those 
who had committed sacrilege at Delphi.  Buckler claims that “by subjecting the captured 
Lokrians to this fate, Philomelos emphasized the Phokian claim to the presidency of the 
sanctuary.”27 By 356 Philomelos established alliances with pro-Phocian Delphians, those 
who also had alliances with Athens already.
28
 
Previously in 357, when the Social War between Athens and the central and 
northern territories accelerated, Athens had taken back Euboea from Boeotia, but “badly 
over-extended [herself] financially.”29  This war also resulted in an alliance between 
Macedonia and the Chalkidian League.
30
  With Athens, Thessaly, and Macedonia 
preoccupied in the north, they had little time to contribute to the escalation at Delphi until 
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355, when the Social War ended and the Sacred War began.  “The Thessalians were now 
ready to support the Thebans positively.”31   
Over the two years between the seizure of the site in 357 and the beginning of the 
war in 355, the Phocians created a military campus at the sacred site.  They destroyed 
stone inscriptions which depicted them badly, specifically the stelai which had inscribed 
the charges placed against them by the Amphictyony.  They fortified the site with walls 
and barracks.
 32
  The most irreligious part of the Phocian takeover was the reaction of 
Philomelos to the Pythia.  He dragged her to her tripod and forced her to make a 
prophecy.  Diodorus recounts that she uttered a sentence to Philomelos, which he took as 
an oracle: “It is within your ability to do as you wish.”33 
Phocis believed herself to now preside over Delphi, with the ability to govern 
states’ wishes to participate in Delphic politics.  With the oracle from the Pythia, 
Philomelos felt the site had transferred power in accordance with Apollo’s wishes.  He 
sent ambassadors to the Greek states asking for their endorsement of the Phocian 
presidency at Delphi in agreement with the power bestowed on them anciently.
34
   Sparta 
welcomed the Phocian ambassador, and sided with the Phocians.  This Spartan policy 
proved beneficial not only to get back at the Amphictyony for the fine, but for more 
grand purposes like tying up the central Greeks in a war, leaving the Spartans to recover 
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the Peloponnesian territory they had lost to the Thebans.
35
   
The Phocian ambassadors had less success among the central Greek states.  The 
Locrians called upon the Boeotian League to avenge Delphi, the Amphictyony, and 
Apollo.  The Thebans sent their own ambassadors to rally the participants of the 
Amphictyony, and arranged for a “special session” of the Amphictyony in the fall of 356 
at Thermopylae to discuss plans of action.  Buckler deduces, “Since Sparta and Athens 
had publicly declared for Philomelos, they may have boycotted the meeting.”36  But as 
Larsen points out — and as has been mentioned previously — the Spartans had little 
influence on the Amphictyony to begin with.
37
  The two biggest forces in the 
Amphictyonic League, the Thessalians and Thebans, supported a sacred war with 
enthusiasm.
38
  The split of support between the central Greeks, Athens, and Sparta — 
producing a division of the Amphictyonic League — created stasis again in Greece.  
Xenophon laments that “there was still greater indecision and confusion than before in 
Greece.”39  The Amphictyony, during the special session, voted to go to war with 
Phocis.
40
  “The Amphiktyonic declaration of war meant that Philomelos could expect a 
concerted attack in spring 355.”41   
The year 355 had other significance in the north.  The tyrants of Pherae had struck 
a peace with the rest of Thessaly three years previous under a watchful Macedonian eye, 
but tensions heightened again in 355 after the Thessalian League wished to vote in favor 
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of the Amphictyony.  Larissa asked Philip to intervene.  How long he took in Thessaly is 
uncertain, since more pressing escalations were taking place at the same time at Methone 
between Macedonia and the Athenian ally, but Philip restored order in Thessaly, much to 
the dismay of Pherae, but the rest of Thessaly would work mutually with Philip through 
the conclusion of the Sacred War.
42
  Hammond notes, “Alliance with the Thessalian 
League brought Philip into the orbit of Central Greece.”43  He now had the opportunity to 
influence Greek politics and had permission to intervene militarily.   
By spring 355, Philomelos prepared for a two-front war — the Locrians and 
Thessalians threatening from the north, and the Boeotians from the east — with little 
support from either Athens or Sparta.  The Achaeans, however, sent him 1500 men.
44
  
Philomelos took the more bold action of fighting the Locrians and Thessalians before the 
Boeotians arrived to fight in the east.  He invaded Locris first, which fell easily without 
support.  The Thessalians arrived to fight with the Locrians, but even together they fell at 
Argolas.  They fought valiantly for a cause they truly believed in, and had not sent troops 
outside the borders of Thessaly since Jason of Pherae left for Leuctra.
45
  The Boeotians 
made their way towards Locris to aid their allies.  The Phocians fled, but some prisoners 
had been taken by the Boeotians.  Two massacres took place thereafter, the Boeotians 
killing the Phocian prisoners as temple robbers, and the Phocians retaliating with the 
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same punishment on their captives.
46
   
The two armies met again soon after at Neon.  The Boeotians beat the Phocians, 
which led the Phocians to flee to Mt. Parnassos.  Philomelos had been injured in the 
battle, and launched himself off a cliff of Parnassos to avoid capture by the Boeotians, a 
sardonic ending for the Phocian leader.  Onomarchos quickly took over and led the 
Phocian army to safety at Delphi, and the Boeotians returned to Thebes.  The Boeotian 
commander, Pammenes, “won the greatest battle of his career, [but] he failed to use his 
victory to end the Sacred War.”47  This mistake by Pammenes made way for more years 
of war, and for the emergence of Macedonia as hegemon.
48
   
Diodorus provides inconsistent accounts about whether the Phocians used 
reserves from the Delphic treasury to fund the mercenaries fighting for them.
49
  But 
doubtless, Onomarchos dipped into monies dedicated to the god to fund the war from 354 
onward.  Acting as tyrant, Onomarchos confiscated property of his Phocian political 
opponents.  With the stolen funds, Phocis could now build an adequate army to face the 
rest of the central Greeks.  The Phocians used dedications made of bronze and iron for 
the creation of weapons.  Gold and silver dedications were melted down to make coins.
50
   
While Onomarchos built his military might in 354, the Thessalians struggled 
again with civil war.  While the Thessalian League had been away fighting Philomelos, 
the tyrants of Pherae seized the opportunity to take control of Thessaly yet again.  
Onomarchos kept track of the situation in Thessaly from Delphi with much enjoyment; 
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Philip, on the other hand, had “to deal with the Thessalian situation in person and with 
greater firmness than hitherto.”51  Pherae had to appeal to Phocis for help mustering up an 
army to challenge Philip and the Macedonians.  Hammond and Griffith note that Philip 
made a conscious decision to enter “Greek” affairs beyond Thessaly.  Macedonia was 
already engaged in a struggle with Athens, and Hammond and Griffith observe that 
Philip, after taking the side of the Thessalian League, sought the support of anti-Athenian 
Greek states.  This led him to a formal alliance with Thebes — although the two states 
had probably amiable relations for at least a half century — in addition to constant 
support of the Thessalian League.
52
  With Philip aiding the Thebans in the Thessalian 
matter to maintain a coalition to fight the Sacred War, the Thebans were able to 
reciprocate by helping Philip settle matters in Thrace.
53
  The diplomacy practiced 
between the two states illustrates the legacy left to each by Pelopidas and Epaminondas. 
Onomarchos fought a diplomatic battle in the north to keep Thessaly preoccupied, 
while also fighting a physical battle, taking continual territory from Locris and Amphissa, 
a city within the borders of Phocis.  He worked steadily to promote a pro-Phocian stance 
in Locris, and made headway with her leaders.  In addition, Onomarchos provided the 
tyrants of Thessaly with Delphic funds to hire mercenaries and fight off the Thessalian 
League.  “In fact,” Westlake remarks, “the Thessalians took no further part in the Sacred 
War until its closing stages were reached.”54  When the Thessalian tyrants failed to 
overtake Philip’s troops in Thessaly, he sent his own army to Thessaly to take care of the 
matter.  Diodorus explains that Onomarchos won two decided battles against Philip there, 
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  Philip said he was “retiring like a ram in order to butt the harder a 
second time.”56   
The next campaign came in 353, and opened with Onomarchos marching into 
Thessaly, since he “now appeared to be invincible.”57  Philip again came to the aid of the 
Thessalian League, and soon thereafter, the League appointed him the commander of 
their army.
58
  Philip and Onomarchos finally met at the Crocus Plain.  Philip’s men wore 
laurel wreaths as “warriors of Apollo,” and won decidedly and had the Phocian prisoners 
drowned as temple robbers, and Onomarchos hanged.
59
   
At that point Philip exercised his second successful diplomatic policy.  The 
Thessalian League looked to take over Pherae without any trouble, but Philip had other 
plans.  He did not want to waste any more time in battle with the then powerless Pherae, 
when he could march south to assist in the Sacred War.  His objective was to take the 
pass at Thermopylae.  The mercenaries of Pherae had moved on to protect the pass, as 
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well as Phocians, Athenians, Spartans, and Achaeans.  Philip, rather than facing the 
challenge, decided to take his troops back to Thessaly.
60
   
“Despite the fact,” Buckler writes, “that the campaigning-season of 353 was a 
virtual repetition of 355, the Phokians once again rallied.”61  Onomarchos’ brother, 
Phayllos, had been made commander of both the Phocian League and army.  Before the 
next campaigning season began, Phayllos attempted what both his predecessors had — 
diplomatic coercion of Phocian allies to participate in the Sacred War, rather than relying 
on mercenaries.  To attract the Spartans in particular
 
, Phayllos changed the military 
strategy to focus on Thebes and Boeotian territory, rather than provoking Philip in 
Thessaly.  With aid from their allies piling in, Phocis set out to take on Boeotia, where 
they lost battle after battle to the smaller numbered troops of the Boeotians.  Phayllos 
could not manage as a general, and every battle he charged into against the Boeotians.
62
  
The failed skirmishes led by the Phocians against the Thebans lasted the entire campaign 
season of 352.  Phayllos took time to consider his options during the offseason, and 
decided to go back to Onomarchos’ plan of taking out eastern and western Locris one city 
at a time, slowly making his way towards Thermopylae, an area critical to Boeotia.  He 
took possession of three crucial cities leading to the narrow corridor.  Having taken these 
cities, he made his way toward Boeotia.  Phayllos managed to take the whole of eastern 
Locris, and pushed the Boeotians back, but was overcome with a disease in the midst of 
the seizure.  Nevertheless, no longer did any territory separate Phocis from Boeotia.
63
   
The timing of Phayllos’ death from illness benefitted the Boeotians, since 
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developments in the Peloponnese demanded their attention.  The Spartans, taking 
advantage of the Boeotian preoccupation in central Greece, took the opportunity to renew 
an attack on Megalopolis.  The Boeotians came to the aid of their Peloponnesian ally, 
along with others that Sparta saw fit to recapture.  Though the Boeotian forces were 
depleted from the Sacred War, they managed to hold Sparta to a standstill, which 
eventually led to each side venturing back to their own territories, leaving the allies 
without capture.
64
  Thebes had “succeeded in putting Sparta out of the Sacred War.”65 
The Sacred War’s campaign season of 351 ended with Boeotian forces returning 
from the Peloponnese to put down fronts placed by two new leaders of the Phocians, 
neither of which had commanding experience, and who fell easily to the Boeotians on 
multiple fronts, including at Neon.
66
  Running out of money, allied support, and 
commanders, the Phocians were nearing the end of their prowess in central Greece.  The 
Boeotians as well, however, struggled to finance the costly Sacred War, in addition to 
campaigns into the Peloponnese, and resorted to appealing to the Persian king to finance 
the war effort, which he did.
67
   
In the north, Philip had ventured back to Macedonia no doubt to work on 
administrative dealings during the Olympic Truce to finish the year, and took care of 
business in Thrace while he was in the north.
68
  He did find himself again in Thessaly 
soon after, when the Thessalians awarded the position tagos of the Thessalian League, 
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and Philip had taken some of their western territory.  Philip, though, did not have to take 
any territory by force from either side of the Thessalian political bodies.  He won tageia 
and the territories by use of diplomacy, in a region in desperate need of such a concept.  
“The Thessalians,” Westlake adds, “owed to him a very real debt of gratitude for 
removing the Pheraean tyranny,” but Philip did not promote Macedonian monarchy over 
Thessaly.
69
  He acted as archon, but with little political control of the region, in order to 
keep the peace.  He understood replacing one tyranny with (what could be construed as) 
another would not bode well for him or his state. 
The campaign season of 349 opened with strong Boeotian force to rid Locris of 
Phocian presence.
70
  Battles took place along the borderlands which, overall, the 
Phocians won.  Again the Phocians threatened western Boeotia, and took cities which the 
Boeotians could not defend well.  “The campaigning-season of 349 left the Thebans in 
desperate straits.”71  Philip was not much better off in Thessaly.  Buckler takes 
Demosthenes’ account as fact, saying that the Thessalians grew tired of Philip, so Philip 
had to assert his control.
72
  Neither Hammond, Griffith, nor Westlake agree with this 
account, and believe Demosthenes to have exaggerated.
73
  The most unbiased of these 
scholars is probably Westlake, since his scholarship deals directly with Thessaly.  Athens 
made its way into the Thessalian fight, hoping to oust Philip.  Since Philip acted 
continually in Thessalian interests, Athens gained little traction, and the Thessalians 
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repeatedly upheld Philip as tagos.
74
  Buckler also argues that Philip had a greater interest 
in pursuing Thrace and the Chalkidice than he did in pursuing the Phocians.  Again, the 
Macedonian scholars and Westlake disagree, stating that Philip’s interest lay in pursuing 
that which pertained to Thessaly.  If Philip had cared more for territories in the north, he 
would have spent considerably more time there; instead, he occupied himself with the 
northern territories when they posed a threat.
75
   
The Thebans — struggling to keep up with the Phocians — were dealt another 
blow.  Phalaikos attempted to take Euboea in 349.  Tyrants had political domination on 
the island, with allied support from Athens, but the Phocians decided to provide the 
Euboeans with mercenaries to secure the island from the Boeotians.  The Athenians acted 
quickly to stop the overthrowing of one tyrant for a Phocian-appointed tyrant with 
mercenary support, and sent their decorated commander, Phocion, to Euboea.  The 
Euboeans requested the help of Philip against the Athenians.  Philip did not respond, but 
the Euboeans were able to claim autonomy once again by defeating the Athenians in 348.  
With the Athenians distracted, however, Philip was able to take the northern city 
Olynthus, which both the Athenians and Macedonians had contested since the beginning 
of the Social War.
76
   
Philip promised the Thessalians he would intervene in the Sacred War on their 
behalf, in order to win back the complete loyalty of the League and outside members of 
Thessaly.  Unlike his predecessors, Phalaikos did not want to intrude in Thessaly, since 
he knew it would bring down the might of the Macedonian army.  He instead focused his 
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attention on Boeotia and the pass of Thermopylae.
77
  The Thebans took the offensive in 
348, cutting off supply lines at Neon to the Phocians, weakening them considerably.  The 
Phocians retaliated, pushed the Thebans back, and defeated them handily in battle.  Once 
again, the Thebans faced the end of a campaign season with nothing much to show, and 
with an imposing threat to western Boeotia by the Phocians for the next campaign 
season.
78
   
In 347 the Phocians mounted an attack on Boeotian soil, one which ended with 
the burning of yet another of Apollo’s temples, this one at Abae.  The impious act 
outraged the Thebans, who knew at that point they required help from another source.
79
  
During the summer, they requested the help of Philip.  “This was the situation that 
Demosthenes had feared at least as early as 349, when he warned that the fall of Olynthus 
might be followed by joint Theban-Macedonian action.”80  While in the midst of the 
peace talks, Philip did not seem willing to jeopardize the diplomacy he had begun to 
undertake with Athens when the Thebans approached him.  Westlake says that he had to 
be convinced by the Thessalians to keep his promise to them, which required him to enter 
the Sacred War on behalf of the Thebans and Thessalians.
81
  Buckler takes the account of 
Demosthenes to heart here, saying that Philip had been lusting to enter the war, and 
sought to be the savior of not only the Thebes he loved, but Apollo.
82
  This is a 
romanticized belief of Philip that does not fit his character entirely.  Given his tendency 
to lean toward diplomacy and to not seek military action when it was unnecessary, he 
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more likely had to be convinced to enter the war on behalf of the Thebans and 
Thessalians.   
Philip managed diplomatic talks between the Athenians and the Theban allies, all 
of which sent him envoys during the winter of 347/6.  Phalaikos, giving Philip the 
attention he deserved, sent considerable forces to the mouth of Thermopylae to defend 
against the able Macedonian army.  The fear of Philip led the Phocians to eject Phalaikos 
from his position as leader of the Phocians in general as well as the army, but after a 
short-lived diplomatic mission to Athens and Sparta for aid failed, the Phocians reinstated 
Phalaikos.  This was a decision that left the Phocians and their allies wary of any ability 
to win the war.  The Athenians voted on the matter in spring, deciding to go ahead with 
the Peace of Philocrates, and declaring peace with the Macedonians.  This decision 
developed a break in the relationship between Athens and Phocis, and Phocis suddenly 
found herself standing against the Macedonians and their allies alone.  Phalaikos, 
understanding his impossible situation, surrendered to Philip.
83
   
“Aeschines,” Edward Harris concedes, “had admitted Philip’s goal of ending the 
war was just.”84  Athens struggled to come to terms with the impossibility of winning the 
war, or even regaining their supremacy in Greece as hegemon.  Athens, led by the 
rhetoric of Demosthenes, saw the potential of Philip and the Macedonians.  But upon 
seeing the loss of their power, the Athenians took advantage of their situation to make a 
deal with Philip, while abandoning the Phocians.  The decision took time that the 
Athenians did not have, and was debated endlessly among Aeschines and Demosthenes.
85
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 The initial treaty did not include the Phocians.  Philip and his Macedonians 
marched toward Thermopylae to ensure the peace took place.  Athens still feared 
retaliation from the Macedonians and tried their best to please them, including 
abandoning their Phocian allies.  The Macedonians brought with them the Amphictyonic 
contingent from both Thebes and Thessaly to ensure the end to the Sacred War and the 
reinstatement of the Amphictyony.  Since the war split members of the Amphictyony, it 
had not existed as a body in nearly ten years.  The Athenians decided to join the 
Amphictyonic League coming in with Philip.
86
  Concerning the Athenians, Buckler 
remarks “in fact, they abandoned an ally in its hour of peril to save their own skins.”87 
 Phalaikos struck a deal with Philip — and by extension the Amphictyony — 
which stated that if Philip would let Phalaikos and his men leave Phocis without harm, 
they would allow Philip to pass through Thermopylae without restraint.  Philip took the 
deal, and marched into Phocis.  The Phocian cities surrendered not to the Amphictyony, 
but only to Philip.  Buckler here makes the observation that Philip “presented himself as a 
major figure in Greek politics, without at the same time seeming to be a barbarian 
intruder.”88  One would be hard pressed to argue that the Thessalians and Thebans, as 
they walked into Phocis with him, would consider Philip a barbarian.  Philip had solid 
relationships with both states, not as an invasive king, but as the head of a Greek state 
with diplomatic ties to each.   
 Part of the punishment to the Phocians laid upon them by Philip included the 
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breaking up of the Phocian League, which had appointed such leaders that saw fit to 
pillage Delphi.  They would not be permitted to form another league until 338, which was 
granted by Philip.
89
  The Amphictyony issued punishments on the rest of the Phocians, 
none of whom were hurled from cliffs for their impiety; rather, the weapons of the 
Phocians were thrown from the cliffs.  They did have to pay a 60-talent a year repayment 
until the amount that had been pillaged had been repaid.  The most interesting 
punishment enforced on the Phocians was their loss of votes on the Amphictyonic 
League.  The Amphictyony gave Philip and his descendants the Phocian votes in the 
Amphictyony.
90
   
 Buckler ends his account of the Third Sacred War with the ascription, “Although 
recent scholarship has generally portrayed Philip as the reluctant conqueror, he showed as 
early as 353 after the Crocus Plain that he had designs in the south.”91  This attribution 
goes against the evidence provided not only by Macedonian and Thessalian scholars, but 
against the evidence Buckler himself provides, as seen in this chapter.  Philip had the 
chance to enter the south well before 346, in fact the Thessalians begged him to do so 
from 355 onward.  He could have ended the conflict well before he did, but chose not to, 
like — for instance — after the battle at the Crocus Plain, when he could have taken the 
war to Phocis after the death of Onomarchos.   
 Instead of portraying Philip as the man who ended the Sacred War, modern 
scholars resort to the ancient tactic of using him as the scapegoat for the misdeeds of all 
the Greek states which participated.  In fact, the Thebans, Phocians, Spartans, and 
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Athenians were all at fault above the Macedonians for the Third Sacred War, and to 
blame Philip and the Macedonians for “invading” Greece when they walked in, without 
intimidation, and with three Greek states at their side, would be to dismiss the obvious 
evidence for personal assumptions.
92
  To project the results of the next several years onto 
Philip and the other political giants at the conclusion of the Third Sacred War would be to 
make the fatal teleological mistake of the historian, making conclusions based on the 
knowledge of the outcome.  No one — not even Philip — could predict the course the 
Greeks would take following the Sacred War.  In fact, Philip tried desperately to be part 
of the “old boys club,” meaning the Greek states, and participate in Greek politics the 
way all the other states participated, and only when that failed, did he try something else. 
 
Athenian Rhetoric and the Legacy of the Third Sacred War 
 Sources give a specific perspective of politics and identity which highlights 
certain biases belonging to the region which the author is from or writes for.  Two 
Athenian rhetoricians, however, highlight the distinctions and biases within Athens 
concerning Philip of Macedon: Demosthenes and Isocrates.  Demosthenes, on the one 
hand, used rhetoric to advance his own propaganda and career to instill fear into the 
Athenians.  Isocrates, on the other hand, endorsed peace with the Macedonians to further 
the Greek schema in Persia.   
“Demosthenes’s ringing denunciations of [Philip] the Macedonian have left a 
highly Atheno-centric view of the events of the mid-fourth century that has had little 
material evidence and few new interpretations of literary sources to prompt a revisionist 
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view.”93  But, arguably, the same could be said for Athenian views of all central and 
northern Greek states.  Demosthenes promoted the imperialistic agenda of the Athenians, 
and made room for blatant Athenian patriotism to support the imprudent idea of 
recovering the Athenian Empire.  He first attempted to describe Philip in a slightly less 
threatening manner, suggesting that Philip was like a boxer, conceding that Philip showed 
finesse in military and political matters.  No punches thrown by the Athenians land, while 
Philip dominates the ring.
94
  This clever image gave Demosthenes his start in rhetoric 
against the Macedonian, and the propaganda built from there.   
“Isocrates, a political thinker at Athens, believed that Philip was a king of culture 
and intelligence, and that he alone in 346 might be able to unite the Greek city-states and 
lead them in a war against Persia.”95  Isocrates used another tactic entirely.  While 
Demosthenes used successful political rhetoric to build upon itself — and used his 
position of power within the Athenian state — Isocrates used the study of politics, ethics, 
and rhetoric to develop well-conceived thoughts to influence contemporary politics, 
especially foreign policy.
96
  Much like Philip, Isocrates saw the benefit in diplomacy, and 
did not shy away from either humility or vulnerability.  Isocrates’ ultimate goal had 
always been Panhellenism.
97
   
Both Demosthenes and Isocrates saw a bigger picture; both knew the talents of 
Philip and the threat of Persia.  Demosthenes used his foresight to perpetuate fear and 
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warmongering — a political approach not so far removed from politics today — while 
Isocrates used it to sponsor peace and diplomacy.  The distinction of who was right and 
who was wrong does not get to the heart of the matter, but rather whose rhetoric did the 
Athenians indulge?  Certainly history shows at the end of the day that Demosthenes’ 
rhetoric came out ahead.  Probably this did not come from any lacking trait from 
Isocrates’ rhetoric, but from the failure of the Athenians to protect the Phocians at the end 
of the Sacred War, and the failure of Aeschines as an orator.  Demosthenes hammered 
Aeschines on two matters of diplomacy: the Peace of Philocrates, and the betrayal of the 
Phocians by Athens.  Although Aeschines helped to organize the end of the Sacred War, 
preventing further Phocian and Greek carnage, Demosthenes organized a case against 
Aeschines set to play out in court.  Demosthenes accused Aeschines of treason, and 
although the court never heard the case, the damage Demosthenes wished to inflict had 
been done.
98
   
H.B. Dunkel examines whether Demosthenes was indeed Panhellenic or not.  He 
shows that in matters of foreign policy — for instance, the potential of a Persian invasion 
— Demosthenes calls upon all Greeks to unite against the foreign power.  But in more 
relevant positions — more relevant since Persia showed no desire or ability to invade 
Greece at this time — Demosthenes exudes Athenian patriotism.  “In short,” Dunkel 
concludes, “Demosthenes is not urging a policy of ‘balance of power’ but hopes so to 
weaken both Thebes and Sparta that Athens may be supreme in Greece.”99  This 
inconsistency in Demosthenes’ own rhetoric illustrates the complexity of Athenian 
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policy.  Hammond underscores Demosthenes’ own delusion about Athenian abilities in 
not only the Sacred War, but also in the Social War, saying Demosthenes “assumed that 
Athens could have saved Olynthus and Phocis and kept Philip out of the Amphictyonic 
League, if only the Assembly had followed [his] advice and not been deceived by corrupt 
orators.”100  Plutarch gives the most accurate depiction of the attempt by Demosthenes to 
restore Athens in his introduction to the Parallel Lives for Demosthenes and Cicero when 
he quotes Ion, saying, “The dolphin’s might is useless upon the dry ground.”101 
Isocrates believes, however, that the Greeks will never recover from endless war, 
unless they take the fight outside of Greece, and work together on the same side. “For 
there is the problem,” Perlman points out from his reading of Isocrates, “of the 
impoverished Greeks who as roaming bands of mercenaries are a menace to the existing 
social and economic structure of Greece.”102  To succeed with this rhetoric, Isocrates tries 
not only to convince Athenians, but writes to Philip to address this same issue, reasoning 
with Philip to unite the Greeks in an effort against Persia.
103
 
The rhetoric of Demosthenes against Philip, as well as the central Greek states, 
comes from a longing for the return of the Athenian Empire that could not prevail, and in 
fact finally gives way to the rising Macedonian state.  The “Atheno-centric” view in 
modern scholarship likewise cannot prevail.
104
  Isocrates, in his ability to speak frankly to 
both Athenians and Macedonians, offers the best insight into the pivotal moment the 
Third Sacred War ushers in, that of the rise of Philip and his Macedonians in Greece 
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proper, and his presence within Greek politics from that moment until his death.  Both 
Demosthenes and Isocrates see it coming, but only Isocrates knows how to properly 
transition into the new direction of Greece, hence Demosthenes’ romanticizing of Athens.  
His love for Athens, and his belief that she could rise again, speaks to not only the end of 
the Classical Period and the decline in full swing of Athens, but to the longing for its 
height to return.  No wonder those with an “Atheno-centric” view despise Philip and 









In 380 BCE, Isocrates, at the end of his Panegyricus, urged the Greeks to come 
together to fight a greater power, rather than continuing to quarrel among themselves.  He 
pleads for Panhellenism to enter into Greece, to let Athenian generals fight alongside 
Spartan generals in order to accomplish one Panhellenic objective: defeat the Persians.
1
  
Isocrates saw the potential for a united Greece, and saw room to fit Philip and Macedonia 
in with it.  He saw Philip as the catalyst for this, but could never have predicted what 
would happen in just a quarter century from the end of the Sacred War.   
The city-state was on its way out, hence the romanticizing of the individual city-
states at the end of the Classical Period.  “From 348 onwards,” Hammond relates, 
“[Philip] was concerned not to destroy but to utilize the great potential of the city-states 
of the Greek mainland.”2  Philip appreciated the tradition of the city-state as much as any 
other Greek, and gained more of an appreciation for them than any other Macedonian, 
due to his time spent in Thebes.  Greek city-states by their very nature, however, allowed 
little room for political Panhellenism.  Federations in the form of leagues maintained 
alliances, but no overall political unification, save for one: the Delphic Amphictyony.
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Due to the nature of the sacred space at Delphi, the Greeks saw it as incorruptible, 
and therefore worthy of a consistent alliance and protection.  The need for a federation 
toprotect the site came from the First Sacred War, when Delphi relied on the power of the 
states with a vested interest in the security of the site — all states which participated in 
Delphic sacred matters, save for the lone state exploited during the Sacred War — after 
Delphi felt its autonomy and sanctity was threated.  In that case, the members of the 
federation attacked the town of Crisa to establish a united front.  The legacy left by the 
razing of Crisa to the ground made way for a two-and-a-half century struggle Phocis 
sustained to legitimately reclaim lost space.  The result of the First Sacred War proved 
that Greek states could secure the site while never taking control of the site.  The sacred 
site of Delphi belonged to the god Apollo, with particular Greek states interested in 
fighting on behalf of the god to prove their loyalty to not only the god, but Greece as a 
whole.  Despite its small size then, this unique site benefitted from a divine authority 
which bested any dominant political authority in Greece. 
Preeminent evidence for this exemplary power of the Amphictyony comes from 
the Second Sacred War in which the Spartans — despite struggling for hegemony against 
the Athenians during the Archidamian War — fought on behalf of the Delphians to 
maintain autonomy and leading voice on the Amphictyony in order that Sparta could 
preserve a loosely held vote.  Interestingly enough, the battle between Sparta and Athens 
for political dominance at Delphi led to the subjugation of the town of Delphi to the 
Spartans, and the region of Phocis to the Athenians.  Since the elite positions of both the 
sacred site of Delphi and the Amphictyony carried so much weight, the Spartans and 
Athenians did not see the advantage in threatening either, but sought the next best thing, 
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which was domination over the smaller states that had immense influence on the site and 
Amphictyony.  With the two most powerful states, Sparta and Athens, struggling in a 
widespread conflict, devoting so much time to a seemingly insignificant region points to 
the Panhellenic nature of the Delphic site, and the federal power that controlled it.   
The Second Sacred War illuminated, though, how little influence Sparta and 
Athens had in central Greek politics.  The Amphictyony, while Panhellenic and of 
interest to all Greeks, was dominated by the central Greeks.  The sacred site of Delphi 
played a role in all Greek politics and military actions.  It held a significant role in all 
Greek state matters, and the Amphictyony was not separate from Delphi, but a branch of 
the divine presence there.  For this reason Phocis — and by extension Athens — accepted 
the punishment laid upon them by the Amphictyony at the end of the Second Sacred War.  
Rather than withdraw from the Amphictyony and condemn it as an institution, these two 
states took their punishment and worked to earn back their place on the Amphictyony.   
Macedonia’s establishment as a Greek state depended on its participation in 
Greek — particularly central Greek — politics before the Third Sacred War.  
Investigations into key concepts of space and identity show how Macedonia interacted 
with Greek states, and how she developed Greek-ness over time, in order that Philip 
could end the Third Sacred War and participate fully in Panhellenic Greek politics.  
Macedonians contended for Greek identity from the time of Alexander I of Macedon.  
Alexander pandered to Herodotus when the latter stayed in the Macedonian court, and 
told glorified stories proving his Greek heritage and participation in the Olympic Games.  
Although the story comes under fire in modern scholarship, facts remain: first, that 
Alexander I thought himself Greek; second, that Herodotus believed Alexander to be 
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Greek.  Whether or not Alexander participated in the Games, Herodotus believed he did, 
and at very least “passed” as Greek in the eyes of the Greek historian.  Likely Alexander 
had been accepted as Greek by some Greek states and not by others.  Athens — having 
given the name Philhellene to Alexander — probably did not recognize the Macedonians 
as Greek, at least not during the lifetime of Alexander.  But Athens did not dictate who 
qualified as Greek and who did not, and in fact other Greek states probably recognized 
Macedonian as Greek, mainly the central Greeks.  The initial “passing” as Greek by 
Alexander made way for others later on, such as Philip, to assimilate much more easily 
into Greek diplomacy and politics.   
Not only did Greek states react differently to the identity of the Macedonians, 
Greek states interacted differently with Macedonia-based spatial politics.  Macedonia 
acted as a shield against enemies entering into Greek territory, since she was located at 
the top of the peninsula.  Those most aware of the threats to Greece if Macedonia could 
not hold back the non-Greek enemies were those most vulnerable to attacks after 
Macedonia.  Thus Thessaly and Boeotia inevitably had better relationships with 
Macedonia, and interacted with Macedonians more to make sure they were not victims of 
obliterating attacks.  These relationships required political, diplomatic, and military 
mediations, leading to a strong bond between the Macedonians and these states.  Thessaly 
and Boeotia, then, were probably more likely to see Macedonians as Greek than other 
Greek states not interacting as much with either Macedonians or these states.   
Macedonia struggled to remain a state due to these threats from either side of her.  
Illyria and Thrace worked in unison to nearly wipe out Macedonia during the reign of 
Amyntas III and Alexander II.  The Thessalians and Olynthians worked to make sure 
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Macedonia did not fall to the non-Greek invaders.  Eventually even Sparta came to aid 
the Macedonians.  Amyntas joined whatever force he believed would keep his kingdom 
afloat, and in 371 joined forces with the Second Athenian League, and was given a vote 
by Athens.  This turn of events, although contested, suggests that by 371 even Athens 
considered Macedonia Greek on some level.  With the death of Amyntas, his eldest son 
Alexander II took over the kingdom at a time when unexpected threats looked to strangle 
Macedonia.  The Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherae pursued a takeover of 
Macedonia.  During this time the Thebans were making a move for hegemonic power, led 
by Pelopidas and Epaminondas.  Pelopidas had travelled to both Thessaly and Macedonia 
to solve difficult matters with diplomacy.  His ability to do so came at a price, and 
Alexander was required to send his youngest brother Philip home with Pelopidas as a 
political hostage.    
During Philip’s time as a hostage he learned not only military tactics and 
strategies — as many scholars have discussed and analyzed— but also diplomatic 
devices, particularly from Pelopidas.  The Thebans were able to wrestle hegemony from 
the Spartans while Philip was in Thebes, where he recognized and learned the Theban 
military maneuvers.  Pelopidas’ relationship with the northern Greeks and Thessaly 
would have also been of interest to the young Philip, and Philip would have paid special 
attention to how Pelopidas treated his brother in Macedonia.  Since Pelopidas treated the 
Macedonians with a heavy hand, but also with respect, Philip would have remembered 
this later on.   
A year after Philip had been sent to Thebes, in 367, Alexander II of Macedon was 
assassinated, leading to another power vacuum in Macedonia.  Ptolemy and then 
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Perdiccas III fought for power.  Perdiccas won eventually and took the side of the 
Thebans against the Athenians for economic goods, particularly timber.  The 
Macedonians would not gain favor with the Athenians again during the era of the city-
state.  The same year, Philip returned home to Macedonia and was given his own τάξις, 
whom he taught Theban military tactics.  By 359 Philip took control of Macedonia 
politically and militarily.  Three years later, Greece entered into the Third Sacred War.  
Philip had by then gained the support and loyalty of the Macedonian military.  Those 
three years proved to be enough for Philip to build a foundation in Macedonia — while at 
the same time Thessaly fell apart and sought the support of their Macedonian allies — 
that would lead to an eventual hegemony.   
No particular state controlled the Amphictyony from its creation after the First 
Sacred War in 590.  That is until 359 and beginning of the Third Sacred War, when the 
Thebans controlled the votes and the Amphictyony did the Thebans’ bidding.  Under the 
protection of the god Apollo, the Amphictyony could exploit states and regions 
surrounding them — particularly Phocis, the region wherein Delphi belonged — but 
remained autonomous under the protection of the Greek states belonging to the 
Amphictyony.  The Thebans challenged the Amphictyony’s ability to remain Panhellenic 
when it used her authority to implement penalties on states for which no penalty should 
have been enforced, particularly against the Spartans for an event which took place in 
382.  Thebans — undoubtedly — spouted pro-Delphian and religious rhetoric, which the 
majority of the central and northern Greek states bought.   
While Thebes fought against the Spartans, Athenians, and predominately the 
Phocians, the Thessalians asked Philip to come into Thessaly to help fight against the 
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tyrants of Pherae.  Thebes — being stretched thin and therefore coming close to losing 
their hegemony— took on the major powers, but needed help from the Thessalians.  The 
Thessalian League came to the Thebans’ aid, but their civil strife made it impossible for 
constant Thessalian support for the Thebans.  The Thebans, then, benefitted from Philip’s 
influence in Thessaly, but they could not continue to take on the rest of Greece to their 
east and south without support and without going bankrupt.  The Third Sacred War split 
Greece in two, with the central and northern Greeks taking on the rest of the Greek states.  
Philip and his Macedonians fit nicely with the Thessalians and the Thebans, and neither 
would have had a problem with recognizing the Macedonians as “one of them.”  The 
Thebans benefitted from Philip’s intervention in Thessaly specifically when he defeated 
the Phocians there and killed Onomarchos, and again when the Thebans asked Philip to 
intervene in the central Greek theater to end the war.  Central Greece from that point on 
essentially gave Philip permission — and in fact encouraged him — to enter into Greek 
politics and military endeavors.  Macedonia maintained Greek-ness, at very least, among 
the central Greeks.   
The Athenians saw the Macedonians in a much different light than the central 
Greeks saw them.  The Athenians had been wrapped in constant skirmishes with 
Macedonia in the north for two decades, and the Macedonians continually fell on the 
opposite side of the Athenians in Greek conflicts.  To make matters worse, Athenians 
went to great lengths to romanticize the fallen Athenian Empire, and to create and 
produce patriotic rhetoric in hopes it might rise again.  No wonder, then, that the 
Athenians villainized the Macedonians and Philip, since the Macedonians obviously 
would prevent them from such lofty goals.  Isocrates saw the potential the Macedonians 
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brought with them into Greece, but Demosthenes could only manage to spit hate and fear.  
Unfortunately for the Macedonians and Philip, the rhetoric of hate and fear lingers much 
longer than that of peace and unification.   
Hate and fear linger also in the historical memory concerning the ancient 
Macedonians.  The Macedonians ushered in the end of the city-state — and hence the end 
of the Classical Period in Greece — and no one can blame or judge the Athenians’ 
romanticism for it to continue.  Those features made Greece unique, and even modern 
scholars look to romanticize them.  But Philip and the Macedonians cannot be blamed for 
the failure of Greece to unite in a way that would preserve their city-state heritage; the 
city-state was on its way out no matter the hegemonic state in control, because the Greeks 
could see the vulnerability of the Persians, and looked to exploit that.  It just so happened 
that the Macedonians led the charge.  Luckily for the rest of the Greeks, Macedonia had 
been made a Greek state officially at the end of the Third Sacred War, and Greek culture, 
tradition, military, and politics were able to spread from the Dalmatian Coast to the 
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